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Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of
Student Cyberspeech
by BRANNON P. DENNING* AND MOLLY C. TAYLOR**
I. Introduction
In 2002, before the start of that year's winter Olympics, Deborah
Morse, the principal of Juneau-Douglas High School, decided to
release students from school to watch the Olympic Torch Relay as it
passed the school on its way to Salt Lake City.1 Joseph Frederick, a
senior at the high school, showed up late, but met his friends across
the street from the school. When the torch passed, in full view of
students on the other side of the street as well as camera crews, he
unfurled a fourteen-foot banner that read, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."2
Principal Morse saw the banner, too. She crossed the street and
ordered him to take it down. When Frederick refused, she
confiscated the banner and later suspended him for ten days for
violating a school board policy prohibiting "any assembly or public
expression that... advocates the use of substances that are illegal to
minors...."'
After the school superintendent upheld a reduced suspension on
appeal, Frederick sued. Frederick lost in the district court, which
. Professor and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland School of Law, Samford
University. B.A., The University of the South, 1992; J.D., The University of Tennessee,
1995; LL.M., Yale University, 1999. I want to thank my 2005 Constitutional Law II class
for making me see that there was much more to the student speech cases than I had
imagined.
"" A.B., The University of Virginia, 2000; J.D., Cumberland School of Law, Samford
University (expected 2008). The authors thank faculty workshop participants at the
Willamette University College of Law, at the University of Tennessee College of Law, and
at the Cumberland School of Law, for questions, comments, and suggestions that
improved the final product.
1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2623.
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granted summary judgment for the school board; but won in the
Ninth Circuit, which found that no disruption of school activities
occurred or was threatened.' Further, the appeals court denied
Principal Morse qualified immunity, holding that "a reasonable
principal in Morse's position would have understood that her actions
were unconstitutional.... "5
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld Morse's decision to
suspend Frederick. The Morse majority-in an apparent effort to
confine the decision closely to its facts-held that "schools may take
steps to safeguard students entrusted to their care from speech that
can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use."6
Morse marks the Supreme Court's first decision addressing the
First Amendment rights of public school students in nearly twenty
years. Part II of our article reviews, briefly, the holdings of prior
cases and, more importantly, the questions spawned by those
decisions with which lower courts have struggled over the years. Part
III summarizes the opinions in Morse and discusses whether the case
provided answers to the questions left by the Court's prior cases, as
well as Morse's implications for future student speech cases generally.
While much of the coverage of Morse stressed the speech-restrictive
result,7 we think it important, as well, to emphasize the Court's
rejection of the expansive powers to regulate student speech that the
school district sought.
The focus of our article, however, is on a particular subset of
student speech: student speech and expression in cyberspace. Morse
comes at a time when school officials are scrambling to fashion
appropriate responses to student cyberspeech.8  Cyberbullying,
inappropriate contact between adults and minors, inappropriate
(sometimes illegal) activity posted for anyone to see on social
4. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2006).
5. Id. at 1123-25.
6. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. The majority did not reach the question of whether
Morse had qualified immunity. Justice Breyer would have reversed on that ground alone.
See id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("I
believe that [the Court] should simply hold that qualified immunity bars the student's
claim for money damages and say no more."). The dissenters, too, would have reversed
the lower court's qualified immunity holding. Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, A Rightward Turn and Dissension Define Court This Term,
WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at A07; Linda Greenhouse, Vote Against Banner Shows Divide on
Speech in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at A18; Bill Mears, 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus' Case
Limits Student Rights, CNN.coM, June 26, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/
06/25/free.speech/; George Will, Quandaries 4 Justices, WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at B07.
8. See infra Part IV.
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networking sites like MySpace-all have outstripped existing school
conduct codes. Since most material is produced off-campus, school
officials are unsure how far their authority to regulate extends. On
the other hand, given the fact that schools are awash in gadgets that
permit students to access the Internet, text message or e-mail one
another, and send pictures and video, the line between on-campus
and off-campus speech is blurring. It is becoming difficult to keep
speech out of schools, even if schools (and perhaps the speaker) want
to. Part IV discusses both the challenges to school administrators
posed by cyberspeech, as well as lower courts' treatments of these
issues in reported cases. Not surprisingly, the court decisions often
mirror the confusion present in student speech cases generally.
Though it did not involve Internet speech, Morse's peculiar facts
offered the Court the opportunity to provide some guidance to school
officials, and an opportunity for it to clarify the scope both of
students' First Amendment rights and school officials' authority to
regulate speech. Unfortunately, Morse's self-conscious minimalism
raises more questions than it answers, especially for student
cyberspeech. Nevertheless, reading between the lines, one can tease
out hints suggestive of the Court's future direction. In Part V we
offer some hypothetical situations, consider what is clear after
Morse-such as the fact that mere offensiveness is not a legitimate
ground for disciplining non-disruptive student speech-and what
remains in question. We also propose standards for resolving the
questions to which Morse provided no answers.
Specifically, we argue that though technology has blurred the line
between on-campus and off-campus speech, a line must be
maintained, lest school administrators claim the ability to regulate
student speech with little or no actual connection to the school. In
difficult cases involving cyberspeech, we would permit school
jurisdiction even if the speech were produced elsewhere, if it was
disruptive or otherwise included within a category of speech the
school was entitled to regulate, and the student either publicized the
speech at school or encouraged others to access the speech at school.
A brief conclusion follows.
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II. The First Amendment Rights of Public School Students:9
An Overview
In this section, we review the state of the law before Morse, with
particular emphasis on the confusion, noted at oral argument,"°
engendered by the few student speech cases the Court had decided.
As will become clear, despite this small number of cases, lower courts
have had difficulty synthesizing and applying them to the myriad fact
situations they have encountered.
A. The Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier Trilogy
While the Court had invoked the First Amendment to invalidate
West Virginia's compulsory flag salute law (after initially upholding
it)," Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District12 is
the usual starting point for any analysis of student speech rights.
There, the Court famously upheld the Tinker children's right to wear,
in school, black armbands symbolizing their protest of American
involvement in Vietnam. 3 Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas
insisted that neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and expression at the schoolhouse gate
'
,
14
and that vindication of the rights of the Tinker children was necessary
to ensure that "state-operated schools" did not become "enclaves of
9. One interesting antecedent question that is almost never explored in any depth in
either the cases themselves or in the literature concerns is why we care whether students
have their free speech rights protected in the first place. Numerous other constitutional
rights are afforded little protection in public schools, yet most seem to agree that speech
rights are different. We will bracket that interesting question for this paper however, hoping
to return to it in the future. For some thoughts, see Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really
Be "Free Speech" in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 45 (2008); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1112789 (last visited April 6, 2008).
10. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278)
(featuring an exchange between Justice Scalia and counsel for Frederick, with Justice
Scalia stating that cases after Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), have "cut back" on Tinker, while Frederick's attorney argued
that Tinker has "stood the test of time for 40, almost 30 years [sic]" in furnishing the rule
for student speech cases); see also id. at 39 (highlighting the confusion surrounding the
definition of "disruption").
11. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
12. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
13. Id. at 504.
14. Id. at 506.
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totalitarianism." 5  Therefore, as long as the speech (or, more
accurately, symbolic speech) did not interfere with the operation of
the school or with the rights of other students in the school,16 an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression."'' 7 Only if a student's
speech activities "materially and substantially"'8 interfered with the
operation of the school, "collid[ed] with the rights of others," or was
reasonably certain to do either, could the school restrict it. 9
Nearly twenty years later, the Court set limits on student speech.
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Matthew Fraser was
suspended for giving a risqu6 nominating speech laced with double
entendres to a high school assembly in Pierce County, Washington."
In reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court
acknowledged that Tinker controlled, but credited evidence
presented at trial that the speech had materially disrupted the school
and perhaps collided with the rights of other students.2' In addition,
the Court seemed inclined to distinguish between the Tinkers' act of
political protest and "the sexual content of [Fraser's] speech,"
suggesting that administrators and judges could make judgments
about the relative importance of the speech when deciding whether it
must be accorded constitutional protection.22 Fraser did not, however,
explicitly hold that it was altering or adding to Tinker's inquiry.
Two years after Fraser, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, the Court declined to apply Tinker to a principal's
decision to spike two stories slated to appear in the school
newspaper.23 As the Court saw it, "[t]he question whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech-
the question we addressed in Tinker-is different from the question
whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
15. Id. at 511.
16. This point was made repeatedly. See id. at 508-09, 512-14.
17. Id. at 508.
18. Id. at 512-13 (quoting Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
19. Id. at 512-13.
20. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-79 (1986). For the speech
itself, which Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion coyly omits, see id. at 687 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment).
21. Id. at 683-86. But see id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I dissent from the
Court's decision... because in my view the School District failed to demonstrate that
respondent's remarks were indeed disruptive.").
22. See id. at 680-81.
23. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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promote particular student speech. ' Instead, the Court concluded
that the school newspaper was a non-public forum and that the
decision to censor the articles (the principal concluded that one
subject (teen pregnancy) was age inappropriate for many of the
school's students and that the other story (about divorce) was unfair
to the father of the student interviewed about her parents' divorce)
was a "reasonable" regulation permissible under the Court's public
forum case law.2
Commentators generally hailed Tinker, and deplored what they
saw as a narrowing of it by Fraser and Kuhlmeier.2 How, exactly,
24. Id. at 270-71.
25. Id. at 267-70, 276. "Nonpublic forums are government properties that the
government can close to all speech activities. The government may prohibit or restrict
speech in nonpublic forums as long as the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint neutral."
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.4.2.4, at
1139 (3d ed. 2006).
26. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 539 (2000) ("[A]bsent
from Bethel and Hazelwood are the three themes of the Tinker majority: the importance
of protecting students' free speech rights, the need for proof of significant disruption of
school activities, and the role of the judiciary in monitoring schools' decisions to ensure
compliance with the Constitution."); David L. Hudson & John E. Ferguson, The Courts'
Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 183 (2002) (explaining that Fraser "curtailed student rights
recognized" in Tinker; advocating a return to Tinker's principles); Robert Block, Note,
Students' Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the Public Schools: Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 739, 762 (1986) (characterizing Fraser as "confusing
and alarming"); Traci B. Edwards, Comment, First Amendment Rights in Public Schools:
Bethel School District v. Fraser, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 907, 931 (1987) ("Fraser is an
example of the Court's willingness to stretch the Constitution past previous limits in order
to achieve its goal of the proper inculcation of fundamental values, even at the expense of
suppressing a student's first amendment right of freedom of speech."); Royal C. Gardner,
III, Note, Protecting a School's Interest in Value Inculcation to the Detriment of Students'
Free Expression Rights: Bethel School District v. Fraser, 28 B.C. L. REV. 595, 624 (1987)
("[Fraser] greatly expanded the Tinker exceptions to First Amendment protection.");
Shari Golub, Note, Tinker to Fraser to Hazelwood-Supreme Court's Double Play
Combination Defeats High School Students' Rally for First Amendment Rights: Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 487, 514 (1989) (explaining that Tinker
held for "broad rights for personal expression" while Fraser and Kuhlmeier represent
"obliteration of students' first amendment rights"); Phoebe Graubard, Note, The
Expanded Role of School Administrators and Governing Boards in First Amendment
Student Speech Disputes: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 257, 257, 271 (1987) (describing Fraser as a "departure from a protective first
amendment analysis"; arguing that it "differed sharply" from Tinker); Rita Morgan, Note,
Bethel School District v. Fraser and Student Free Speech, 9 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 369,
387 (1987) (characterizing Fraser as "poorly reasoned" and inconsistent with Tinker);
Carol M. Schwetschenau, Note, Constitutional Protections for Student Speech in Public
High Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1349, 1364
(1987) (explaining that the Fraser Court "dramatically departed from the Tinker concept
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the cases are to be read together was not clear; the Court did not
revisit the question until Morse.
B. Unanswered Questions
At least five important questions are raised, but not resolved, by
the foregoing cases. Four of these questions were implicated by the
facts in Morse. In this part, we discuss these questions and their
treatment in the lower courts. First, can schools regulate speech that
takes place off-campus, if it has disruptive effects in the school, or is
off-campus speech outside the Tinker trilogy altogether? Second,
how "disruptive" must student speech be to trigger schools'
regulatory authority? Third, are schools entitled to punish
"offensive" or otherwise "low value" speech absent any disruptive
effects? Fourth, does the language in Tinker about punishing speech
that "collid[ed] with the rights of others" furnish an independent basis
for regulation, or is that simply a subset of "disruptive" speech
discussed in the case? Finally, on what basis, precisely, was
Kulhmeier decided and how is it to be read with Tinker and Fraser?
1. Can Schools Regulate Off-Campus Speech?
One approach would be to hold that speech off-campus was
beyond the reach of school officials. According to this approach, the
school's authority to punish speech would stop at the schoolhouse
door, regardless of the disruption caused by the outside-the-
of the school as a public forum where the free market of ideas operated" (footnote
omitted)); Sara Slaff, Note, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 205 (1987) (explaining that Fraser "narrowed" First
Amendment rights); Therese Thibodeaux, Note, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser:
The Supreme Court Supports School in Sanctioning Student for Sexual Innuendo in Speech,
33 LOY. L. REV. 516, 525 (1987) (explaining that Fraser seems to represent an
abandonment of the Court's "progressive stance" and a reversion "to the pre-1960's idea
of deference to school authority and to the in loco parentes fuhction of the schools"); Nina
Zollo, Comment, Constitutional Law: School Has Broad Discretion to Prohibit Offensive
Student Speech, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 193, 203 (1987) (predicting Fraser would have "chilling
effects" on student speech).
27. J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student
Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706,
707, 711 (1988) (claiming that Kuhlmeier "eviscerates" Tinker and that Fraser was an
"anomaly"); Helen Bryks, Comment, A Lesson in School Censorship, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
291, 325 (1989) ("[Kuhlmeier] struck a new balance that favors inculcation [of community
values] over students' liberties."); Christopher J. Palermo, Note, Only the News That's Fit
to Print: Student Expressive Rights in Public School Communications Media After
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 35 (1988) (explaining that
Kuhlmeier represented "a further decline in student free speech rights").
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schoolhouse speech. Such an approach could be seen as protecting
the legitimate free speech rights of students while not in school. This
approach could also be seen to have the additional advantage of
being easy to apply-both by school administrators and by reviewing
judges. The initial question would be whether student speech occurs
within the four walls of the school. If the answer is no, then any
content-based regulation of speech would have to survive strict
scrutiny.'
This location-centered approach also finds some support in the
case law. For example, in his Fraser concurrence, Justice Brennan
agreed with the majority that Fraser could be disciplined, but
suggested that if Fraser had given his speech "outside of the school
environment, he could not have been penalized simply because
government officials considered his language to be
inappropriate...."2 9 Some lower courts have agreed, holding that
schools had no right to discipline students for off-campus expressive
activity.3' In a number of post-Tinker cases, many concerning
"underground" high school newspapers, courts adopted a similar
approach, expressing skepticism of school officials' claims of
authority over students' activities when the allegedly disruptive
activities took place off-campus.31
28. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 932 (explaining content-based/content-
neutral distinction).
29. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
30. See Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich.
2002) ("Defendants' regulation of Plaintiff's speech on the website without any proof of
disruption to the school or on campus activity in the creation of the website was a violation
of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights." (emphasis added)); see also Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd.
of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (reversing suspension and expulsion
of student for content on student's website; noting that student "simply accessed his own
website, a website he created on his own time and with his own equipment").
31. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) ("We may not
permit school administrators to seek approval of the community-at-large by punishing
students for expression that took place off school property."); Shanley v. Northeast Indep.
Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that students may not be punished
for off-campus distribution of underground newspaper where distribution "was entirely
off-campus and was effected only before and after school hours" and was "orderly and
polite" with "no disruption actually occur[ing] or... reasonably foreseeable under the
circumstances"); Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986) (holding that
suspension of student for making an obscene gesture at teacher off-campus violated
student's First Amendment rights). In Klein, the court noted that "[t]he conduct in
question occurred in a restaurant parking lot, far removed from any school premises or
facilities at a time when teacher Clark was not associated with his duties as a teacher. The
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On the other hand, what is unsatisfying about this approach is its
formalism. Tinker was concerned with balancing the rights of student
speakers against the right of their fellow students to attend school and
receive education in a safe, orderly atmosphere. Activity that is
disruptive of the educational function of the school or otherwise
violative of the rights of others, 2 Tinker held, was ineligible for First
Amendment protection. Why, then, should it make a difference from
where the disruptive influence originates? Some lower courts have
concluded that it should not-that geography alone should not dictate
whether school officials can regulate the speech. The actual impact,
too, should be considered.3 As we discuss below, this problem can be
particularly acute now that advances in technology make it difficult to
keep "off-campus" speech, well, off-campus.
Even when courts are inclined to think that location matters,
they are often unwilling to say that it controls the outcome of
particular cases. As Judge Newman put it, "[T]erritoriality is not
necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of [school
administrators'] authority. Possibly the traditional standard of the
law that holds a person responsible for the natural and reasonably
foreseeable consequences of his action might have some pertinent
applicability to this issue. ' 4 In some cases, courts turn to the question
of impact on the school, in some cases, as a way to avoid the more
difficult on-campus/off-campus question. If the speech was not
disruptive, then the location question need not be resolved. As we
discuss below, this is true of student cyberspeech cases as well.
student was not engaged in any school activity or associated in any way with school
premises or his role as a student." Klein, 635 F. Supp. at 1441.
32. Assuming that language in Tinker has some independent, judicially enforceable
content, which we discuss below.
33. See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. Of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 829
(7th Cir. 1998) (applying Tinker to determine whether off-campus student speech caused a
substantial disruption on school property); Thomas, 607 at 1058 n.13 (Newman, C.J.,
concurring); Shanley, 462 F.2d at 974 (declining "to hold that any attempt by a school
district to regulate conduct that takes place off the school ground and outside school hours
can never pass constitutional muster"); Baker v. Downey City Bd. Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517,
526 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ("[W]hen bounds of decency are violated in publications distributed
to high school students, whether on campus or off campus, the offenders become subject
to discipline.").
34. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concurring in the result).
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2. What Speech Poses a "Material and Substantial" Disruption to School
Operations?
Focusing on the degree of disruption as a way to avoid the
location question, though, may not get a court very far. Tinker did
not define a "material and substantial" disruption: must it be
pervasive, or can it be concentrated within a small group? Can the
impact on even one person be materially disruptive? Again the
courts differ. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld the
suspension of a student for posting cruel statements about and
caricatures of a single teacher, who, as a result, was forced to take
medical leave, necessitating the hiring of substitutes to take her
classes.35 Other cases have accepted evidence from a superintendent
and a principal that the distribution of an underground newspaper
caused a material disruption because students were reading and
discussing the paper throughout the school day.36 The Fraser Court,
too, seemed inclined to defer a great deal to the judgment of
administrators that Fraser's speech had caused a material disruption.
The potential malleability of the material disruption standard
renders an impact approach potentially less speech-protective than a
geographic approach. How much less protective is hard to know-it
depends on how aggressive school officials would be in establishing
the threshold for disruption, and how deferential to administrators
courts would be. Approving the suspension of a student for a
website's impact on a single teacher, however, as the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did, illustrates that some administrators would be
quite willing to set that bar pretty low, and courts will defer to these
judgments.
Further, it is not entirely clear that there is any logical stopping
point to this power. Granting school authorities the right to control
off-campus student expressive activity that caused or was likely to
cause a material disruption at school would expand the power of
schools. If the impact on a single teacher can be disruptive, then what
35. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002)
(explaining that the use of substitute teachers to replace the teacher on leave
"unquestionably disrupted the delivery of instruction to the students and adversely
impacted the education environment").
36. Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Minn. 1987), affd 855
F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988).
37. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986) (describing reaction
to the speech); id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that schools
have discretion to regulate speech, in part, "to prevent disruption of school educational
activities").
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about the impact on a single student? Could schools, for example,
demand that students not gossip about one another off-campus if the
effects of the gossip were disruptive at school? Could it order
students not to read certain books or view certain programs if
students are likely to come to school and discuss them, perhaps
causing them to neglect their assignments or causing class
disturbances?
3. May Schools Regulate Non-Disruptive, "Low-Value" Speech?
One way to guard against the possibility that school
administrators would use their power to prevent disruption to convert
schools into "enclaves of totalitarianism '3 8 or aggrandize parental
powers may lie in differentiating among types of speech. Were
students punished for expressing opinions on matters of national
import, schools might be held to a higher standard for demonstrating,
say, material disruption or interference. Where "low value" speech
was at issue, on the other hand, schools might be given more leeway.
This might explain the difference in the Court's attitude toward the
Tinkers' armbands on the one hand and Fraser's speech on the other.
Even Justice Brennan conceded that Fraser's speech was
inappropriate and could be punished by the school.39
Thus, if a student is engaging in speech or expression that lies
close to the core of the First Amendment-political speech is the
obvious example-schools should be required to prove pervasive and
serious disruption to the operation of school activities before being
permitted to punish that speech. On the other hand, the farther the
speech gets from the First Amendment's core concerns, the less the
school should have to tolerate it, and perhaps the less it must tolerate
any attendant disruptions, however minor. Under such an approach,
that speech which, like Fraser's, is inappropriate, somewhat offensive,
and that causes some degree of disturbance among the student body
should be liable to regulation by administrators-especially given the
essentially captive audience upon which the speech will be inflicted.
Such low value speech might include, as the school argued in Morse,
speech that is inconsistent with the school's educational mission.'
This distinction, however, would be difficult to apply
prospectively and might offer little predictive value for administrators
38. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
39. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40. Brief for Petitioner at 21-24, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-
278).
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who are faced with a decision whether particular student speech
implicates "core" First Amendment values-whatever those might
be. The more narrowly defined the core, the less speech protective
this approach becomes, and may, like the impact analysis described
above, encourage overreaching on the part of administrators whose
decisions will usually be given some deference by reviewing courts,
even if the deference is not total. The danger of overreaching is
especially worrisome if administrators are given the power to silence
speech, including political or religious speech, which conflicts with
broadly conceived educational missions, like tolerance, peaceful
resolution of conflict, non-violence and the like.41
4. What "Rights of Other Students" May Schools Protect Through
Speech Regulation?
In the words of one lower court, "[t]he precise scope of Tinker's
'interference with the rights of others' language is unclear.,
42
Although the Tinker Court stated that regulation of student speech
requires that such speech "substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students,, 43 the Court did
41. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007) (stating that a school may prohibit a student from wearing
an anti-homosexual T-shirt on school grounds). A rather quick look at the ways in which
lower courts have manipulated Fraser in cases involving student speech on T-shirts
provides a glimpse of the inherent difficulties in regulating "low-value" speech. Broadly
interpreting the standard in Fraser, some lower courts have construed the "plainly
offensive" language as justification for school administrators to regulate the offensive
content of speech. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529-31 (9th Cir.
1992) (defining the Fraser standard broadly); see also Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of
Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) (stretching Fraser to include not just vulgar and
offensive language but also "plainly offensive" language). Other lower courts have
narrowly interpreted Fraser to permit regulation of only sexually offensive language,
thereby refusing to permit administrators to regulate student speech involving other types
of offensive language. See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965,
971 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (finding that a T-shirt bearing anti-homosexual language is
politically offensive, not sexually offensive, and therefore regulation must be analyzed
under the Tinker rule, as opposed to the Fraser rule); see also Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch.
Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (refusing to permit a school to regulate political and
religious speech about contentious issues merely because it was offensive); Castorina v.
Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 540-42 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding Fraser factually
distinct because it applied only to "lewd and indecent speech," not speech involving
viewpoint, such as a T-shirt bearing a Confederate flag symbol). What these student
speech cases show is that while some lower courts continue to use Fraser's "plainly
offensive" language to justify broad regulation of student speech, many other lower courts
focus on the presence or absence of disruptive impact.
42. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
43. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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not definitively create a two-prong standard or even state what rights
of other students are protected. Lower courts have been left to
interpret not only when student speech infringes upon the rights of
other students, but also what those other rights include and even
whether such an infringement is an independent ground for justifying
school regulation.'
For example, in Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board
of Education, a district court ruled that school officials could not
prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt that stated, among other
things, "Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder!" 5
Interpreting the Tinker standard as a two-prong test and recognizing
that "schools can regulate speech that invades the rights of others,""
the court found no authority interpreting what that language actually
meant.47 Using its own analysis, the district court held that "invading
on the rights of other students entails invading on other students'
rights to be secure and to be let alone. 4 8 Because the student speech
at issue was, according to the court, a "silent, passive expression of
opinion," it did not threaten the security of other students or prevent
them from being left alone.49 Therefore, the court found no "collision
with the rights of other students"5 ° and refused to permit the school's
regulation of Nixon's speech. 1
In another case, Harper v. Poway Unified School District 2 the
Ninth Circuit also attempted to define the scope and meaning of the
44. See Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (finding "invading on other students' rights" to
require physical confrontation); see also Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177-78 (stating that Tinker's
"rights of others prong" includes psychological as well as physical security). In fact, it also
appears that lower courts choose to avoid even engaging in deciphering the "rights of
other students" language. See Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (finding not one case which
relied solely on an "invasion on the rights of others" as justification for regulating student
speech).
45. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d. at 967.
46. Id. at 974.
47. See id. (finding not one case which relied solely on an "invasion on the rights of
others" as justification for regulating student speech).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).
51. See id.
52. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 127 S.
Ct. 1484 (2007). For a recent analysis of Harper, see Brian Pickard, Tinkering with the
Rights of Others: Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 7
(2006).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Tinker test when a student was disciplined for an anti-homosexual
message on his T-shirt. In response to a "Day of Silence" held by a
student group at the high school to promote tolerance, including
tolerance of homosexuals, a student wore a T-shirt to school that read
"Be ashamed, our school embraced what God has condemned...
Homosexuality is shameful 'Romans 1:27."'' 3  After refusing to
remove the T-shirt at the request of both a teacher and the principal,
Harper was not permitted to return to classes and spent the day doing
homework in the school conference room.4 Harper was not
suspended and no disciplinary record was created, but he filed suit
for, inter alia, violation of his right to free speech.5
In its opinion, the court specifically stated that Tinker created
two circumstances under which student speech could be curtailed: (1)
if the speech "would 'impinge upon the rights of other students"'56 or
(2) if the speech "would result in 'substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities.' 5' 7 Upholding the school's right to
discipline Harper, the court focused on the effect Harper's speech
could have on other student's rights, rather than any actual disruption
it might cause to school activities. 8 Although the plaintiff argued for
a narrow interpretation of the Tinker "rights of others" language, the
Ninth Circuit held that even when a student speaker does not
"directly accost individual students with his remarks," 9 those remarks
can still infringe upon the rights of those students. 6° According to the
court, such infringement can especially occur where the verbal
assaults include references to a person's race, religion, or sexual
61
53. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171.
54. Id. at 1172 (stating that Harper twice requested to be suspended).
55. Id. at 1173.
56. Id. at 1177 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969)).
57. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514).
58. See id. at 1175 (rejecting the district court's analysis pursuant to "substantial
disruption").
59. Id. at 1177-78.
60. Id. at 1177. Using similar reasoning to that employed in Nixon, the plaintiff in
Harper argued that "Tinker's reference to the 'rights of other students' should be
construed narrowly to involve only circumstances in which a student's right to be free from
direct physical confrontation is infringed." Id. According to the plaintiff, absent physical
contact, the "rights of other students" standard does not come into play. Id. at 1177-78.
61. See id. at 1178 (stating that students have a right to freedom from "verbal assaults
on the basis of a core identifying characteristic" while at school).
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Unlike the "silent, passive, 62 armbands at issue in Tinker, the
court found that the anti-gay T-shirt "'collid[ed] with the rights of
other students' in the most fundamental way, 63 because it targeted
students of a minority group and could cause psychological damage,
which could interfere with their right to learn.64 Finding the scope of
Tinker's "interference with the rights of others" 65 standard to include
a right to be secure from such "psychological attacks," 66 the court
upheld the school's regulation of the anti-gay expression.6
A vigorous dissent argued that the "rights of others" language
only entitles students to protection against "assault, defamation,
invasion of privacy, extortion, and blackmail." ' The dissent went so
far as to accuse the majority of "judicial creation" with "no anchor
anywhere in the record or in the law. 69
While it is true that the majority opinion did create its own
definition of what constitutes an interference with the rights of
others,7° the same can be said of the dissent-and really of any court
attempting to interpret such language. The problem lies not with the
lower courts' varied interpretations, but rather with the lack of
guidance that Tinker (and the later Court cases) provides on the
subject. Until the Supreme Court clarifies what other rights students
are entitled to (if any) and also whether an invasion of those rights is
an independent justification for limiting student speech, courts will
continue to be forced to interpret Tinker's "rights of others"
language, and school administrators will continue to be unsure of
their ability to regulate student speech. The Supreme Court's
reaction to Harper-it granted the petition for certiorari, then
62. Id. at 1177 n.16 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
63. Id. at 1178 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
64. Id. at 1178-79 (finding that such speech could be "detrimental not only to
[students'] psychological health and well-being, but also to their educational
development."). The court specifically distinguished the armbands in Tinker, finding that
they did not "'collid[e] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone."'
Id. at 1177 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
65. Id. at 1178.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1183.
68. Id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1201. The dissent was also dissatisfied with the lack of evidence of
psychological damage and the majority's classification of homosexuals as a minority group.
Id. at 1199-1201.
70. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
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vacated judgment, depriving the case of precedential value-strongly
suggested that it was in no hurry to provide that guidance.71
5. What Does Kuhlmeier Mean for Student Speech Cases?
In Kuhlmeier, the Court declined to apply Tinker to a principal's
decision to spike two stories slated to appear in the school
newspaper.7 ' As the Court saw it, "[t]he question whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech-
the question that we addressed in Tinker-is different from the
question whether the First Amendment requires a school
affirmatively to promote particular student speech., 73 Justice White,
writing for the Court, began with a characterization of the school
newspaper as a non-public forum.74 The question was whether
"school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those
facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general public' or by some
segment of the public, such as student organizations., 75 If not, then
there is no public forum "and school officials may impose reasonable
restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of
the school community., 76 After reviewing the context in which the
newspaper was produced, i.e., as part of a journalism class at the
school, as well as the process of editorial approval, Justice White
concluded that there was no public forum created and that "school
officials were entitled to regulate the contents of [the newspaper] in
any reasonable manner., 77 The Court concluded that the spiking of
the stories was reasonable under the circumstances. 8
The opinion repeatedly stressed the connection between the
newspaper and the journalism class of which it was a part. The
question here, Justice White wrote, "concern[ed] educators' authority
over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
71. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
72. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). For a thorough
treatment of Kuhlmeier and school-sponsored speech, see Emily Gold Waldman,
Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored
Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2008).
73. Id. at 270-71.
74. Id. at 270.
75. Id. at 267 (citing and quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.,
460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7, 47 (1983)).
76. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7).
77. Id. at 270.
78. See id. at 274-76.
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expressive activities" that might be seen as school-sponsored.7 9 The
test seemed to be whether the expressive activities "may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum" and conceded that
while they need not "occur in a traditional classroom setting," they
must be "supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences. '
Educators may exercise more control over this expressive activity
"to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and
that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed
to the school."8' The school as publisher or producer, Justice White
continued, may "disassociate itself" from disruptive speech, as well as
"speech that is... ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for
immature audiences,"' including refusal to "sponsor student speech
that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use,
irresponsible sex," and the like.' Schools are entitled to set high
standards for "student speech.., disseminated under its auspices"
and those standards may be higher than that of the "real world,"
according to Justice White."
Tinker, Justice White concluded, simply did not furnish the
appropriate analytical framework "for determining when a school
may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of
student expression."85  Finally, warning against the dangers of
judicialization of the area, Justice White ended by saying that "only
when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical
production, or other vehicle of student expression has no valid
educational purpose" does the First Amendment require judicial
intervention.'
Kuhlmeier was the Court's last word on student speech, and its
most confusing. The school district's argument in Morse
79. Id. at 271.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
83. Id. at 272.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 272-73.
86. Id. at 273.
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demonstrated that a broad reading of Kuhlmeier would give
administrators wide latitude to regulate speech that is at odds with or
that undermines curricular goals of the school. There are two
problems with that reading of Kuhlmeier. First, as the Court makes
clear, what constitutes a school's curriculum is not circumscribed by
physical location. School-sponsored activities need not take place in
the classroom or even on school property, as long as there is some
faculty supervision and the activity is designed to impart knowledge
or skill to students."' Second, while the Court mentioned some fairly
easy cases in which schools could regulate students' speech-athletic
contests, publications, field trips, and theatrical productions-there
are no clear criteria offered for distinguishing that expression which
schools may regulate under this framework and that which fall
outside it. It is possible that Kuhlmeier was written more broadly
than necessary. If it truly was a public-forum case, then once it was
established that the newspaper was a non-public forum and the
spiking of the stories reasonable, there was nothing more to say.
But Kuhlmeier's mischievous potential is illustrated by the
school's argument in Morse. At bottom, the school's position was
that Frederick's banner conflicted with its school-sponsored aim of
discouraging illegal drug use among its students.88 Frederick used the
Olympic Relay, the argument runs, to display his banner precisely
because he knew that the presence of a large crowd, facilitated by the
school dismissal to watch the Relay, virtually guaranteed that the
banner would garner publicity." The school further argued that those
seeing the banner might erroneously associate the message on the
banner with the school itself, further hindering the school's anti-drug
aims.'o At least one commentator has endorsed a similar use of
Kuhlmeier, arguing that it might do less damage to in-school student
speech rights than, say, explicitly endorsing a Fraser "exception" to
Tinker for low-value speech.91
87. Id. at 271.
88. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 25-30.
89. Id. at 31-32.
90. Id. at 32-34.
91. Murad Hussain, The "Bong" Show: Viewing Frederick's Publicity Stunt Through
Kuhlmeier's Lens, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 292, 292 (2007) ("This Commentary
suggests that the Court could endorse the power to punish students who turn school events
into their personal public soapboxes without also letting schools suppress certain messages
regardless of context.").
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lIl. Morse v. Frederick and Its Implications for Student Speech
In this Part, we describe Morse and its likely impact on student
speech. We first discuss the opinion itself and whether Morse
answered any of the questions left open by the Tinker trilogy. We
include some observations on what Morse might mean for student
speech rights generally, before turning, in Part IV, to the specific
question of school regulation of online student speech.
A. The Opinions
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, opened
its analysis with an emphatic rejection of "Frederick's argument that
this is not a school speech case," citing the facts that it was held
during school hours, was sanctioned as a school-approved social event
or trip, that teachers supervised students observing the Relay, and
that "[t]he high school band and cheerleaders performed." The
Chief Justice characterized the Olympic Torch Relay as "a school-
sanctioned and school-supervised event," to which school conduct
rules applied,93 and thus avoided the "uncertainty at the outer
boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech
precedents." 94
Next, the Court endorsed the principal's interpretation of
Frederick's banner, i.e., that it advocated or endorsed illegal drug use,
contrary to school policies.' Advocacy could be inferred, Chief
Justice Roberts wrote, either by "interpret[ing the banner] as an
imperative: 'Take bong hits,"' or by "view[ing the banner] as
celebrating drug use-'bong hits are a good thing,' or 'we take bong
hits."' The Court saw no difference between "celebrating illegal
drug use in the midst of fellow students and outright advocacy or
92. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007). For commentary on Morse, see
generally Symposium, Speech and the Public Schools After Morse v. Frederick, 12 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1 (2008); Joanna Nairn, Recent Development, Free Speech 4 Students?
Morse v. Frederick and the Inculcation of Values in Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
239 (2008).
93. Id. at 2622.
94. Id. at 2624.
95. Id. at 2624-25 ("Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by
those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use, and that interpretation is plainly a
reasonable one.").
96. Id. at 2625 (internal brackets omitted).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
promotion."'  Frederick's (and the dissenting Justices') subsequent
characterization of the banner's message as nonsensical or silly was
dismissed: "Gibberish is surely a possible interpretation of the words
on the banner, but it is not the only one, and dismissing the banner as
meaningless ignores its undeniable reference to illegal drugs." 98 In
either case, however, the Court pointed out that the banner did not
"convey[] any sort of political or religious message" nor was it part of
a "political debate over the criminalization of drug use or
possession." 99
Having thus narrowed the question, the majority then turned to
its student speech precedents. Not surprisingly, in light of Roberts's
professed interest in minimalism, there was no sweeping
reinterpretation of them. Yes, the Court acknowledged, Tinker held
that mere anticipation of disorder was not sufficient to ban student
speech in school, at least where the speech was silent, passive, and not
disruptive."° But, it added, "[t]he essential facts of Tinker are quite
stark, implicating concerns at the heart of the First Amendment."'0'
Further, the Court wrote that Fraser "established that the mode
of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute,"'' though "[t]he mode
of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear."1 °3 The Fraser
Court did take into account the content of Fraser's speech as well as
the fact that it was made in a school assembly.' 4 Without definitely
reconciling the two cases, Chief Justice Roberts argued that two
points could, at a minimum, be taken away from Fraser: (1) students
do not have the same free speech rights as adults and can be punished
for speech in school that the state could not lawfully punish
elsewhere;" and (2) "disruption" was not the constitutional sine qua
non for punishing student speech.' ° "Whatever approach Fraser
97. Id.
98. Id. It may be that Frederick just hoped to be shown on television, but, as the
Court wrote, "[T]hat is a description of Frederick's motive for displaying the banner; it is
not an interpretation of what the banner says." Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 2625-26.
101. Id. at 2626.
102. Id. at 2627.
103. Id. at 2626.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2627.
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employed, it certainly did not conduct the 'substantial disruption'
analysis prescribed by Tinker.... "'w
Finally, while it "[did] not control this case," the Court found
Kuhimeier "instructive" because it acknowledged "that schools may
regulate some speech" the government would not be permitted to
regulate outside of school." "And, like Fraser, it confirms that the
rule of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech."'09
Relying in part on its cases creating exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment requirement of probable cause in public school search
and seizure cases,11° the majority proceeded to recognize, in essence, a
"special needs" exception permitting school officials to prohibit
student speech that encouraged or celebrated illegal drug use.1" Both
the special circumstances of the public school environment as well as
the "'important-indeed, perhaps compelling' interest" in "deterring
drug use by schoolchildren" supported such an exception. Given
the amount of resources devoted to discouraging drug use among
teens and pre-teens, "[s]tudent speech celebrating illegal drug use at a
school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers,
thus poses a particular challenge for school officials working to
protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug
abuse."" 3
But the majority refused to endorse the broader rule urged by
the school district-that schools be allowed to punish student
expression deemed "offensive." The majority held that interpretation
107. Id. We think that this is debatable.
108. Id. ("Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one would reasonably
believe that Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur.").
109. Id.
110. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (permitting mandatory testing for
all students participating in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995) (permitting mandatory drug testing of student athletes); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (easing search requirements for searches conducted of public
school students on school grounds).
111. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 ("The 'special characteristics of the school
environment' ... and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse-reflected
in the policies of Congress and myriad school boards, including [Juneau-Douglas High
School]-allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as
promoting illegal drug use.").
112. Id. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661). The Court pointed out that drug
use among students is still a problem, "Congress has declared that a part of a school's job
is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use," and that "[t]housands of
school boards throughout the country... have adopted policies aimed at effectuating this
message" to support its "compelling interest" claim. Id.
113. Id
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"stretches Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass
any speech that could fit under some definition of 'offensive.' After
all, much political and religious speech might be perceived as
offensive to some."'".. Frederick could be punished only because his
speech "was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.""' 5
Justice Alito, with Justice Kennedy, joined the Court's opinion,
but wrote separately to emphasize the narrowness of the majority's
holding.' 6 Specifically, he read the majority opinion as "provid[ing]
no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including
speech on issues such as the wisdom of the war on drugs or of
legalizing marijuana for medicinal use."" 7 He went on to explain that,
in his view, Morse should not be read as authorizing additional
restrictions on student speech other than those the Court's cases have
already recognized,"8 and certainly not as any warrant to censor
student speech "that interferes with a school's 'educational
mission.'"". 9
114. Id. at 2629.
115. Id.
116, Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concurred too, and wrote
separately to air his view that Tinker was wrongly decided, should be overruled, and that
history does not support granting public school students any First Amendment rights. Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring). He wrote:
I join the Court's opinion because it erodes Tinker's hold in the realm of student
speech, even though it does so by adding to the patchwork of exceptions to the
Tinker standard. I think the better approach is to dispense with Tinker
altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.
Id. at 2636.
117. Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at 2637.
119. Id. (citation omitted). Adopting a more libertarian tone than that of the
majority's opinion, Justice Alito pointed out how little meaningful opportunity parents
have to influence the content of a public school's educational mission, and how few
meaningful alternatives parents have to public schools in general. Id. Thus, "[t]he
'educational mission' of the public schools" could include "the inculcation of whatever
political and social views are held by [elected and appointed public officials]." Id. That
could "give public school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed." Id. "The argument,
therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment." Id. He added that "[ilt is a
dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority-including their
authority to determine what their children may say and hear-to public school
authorities" and that "[i]t is even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of
authority somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the State."
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Justice Alito justified altering free speech rules with regard to
drugs by reference to the school's duty to protect students in its
charge from physical harm, which he considered a "special
characteristic of the school setting.' 20 Because compulsory school
attendance forces students into the custody of the state, away from
their parents' ability to "monitor and exercise control over the
persons with whom their children associate,'' and potentially
exposes children to "other students who may do them harm,'
22
schools have a special responsibility (and ability) to restrict speech
that "presents a threat of violence,"' ' despite restrictions on
incitement present outside public schools.' "Speech advocating
illegal drug use," he argued, "poses a threat to student safety that is
just as serious, if not always as immediately obvious. 1 25 Schools may
punish "speech advocating illegal drug use," but, he added, "I regard
such regulation as standing at the far reaches of what the First
Amendment permits.'
126
Justice Stevens's dissent actually conceded a good deal to the
majority, including the proposition that students' speech rights at
school are not coextensive with adults' rights,' 27 and that deterring
drug use is important. 2 ' He even accepted arguendo that deterring
drug use supported school restrictions "on any assembly or public
expression that... advocates the use of any substances that are illegal
to minors' 129 and was willing to relax both the First Amendment's
usual hostility to viewpoint discrimination and its requirement of
imminence to punish incitement in such cases.2 ° In his opinion,
120. Id. at 2638.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
125. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But, even though he conceded this point,
Justice Stevens repeatedly cites non-school speech cases and criticizes what he saw as
inconsistencies between the majority's opinion and the other cases.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2646 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id.
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however, Frederick's intent in displaying his banner should control
the interpretation, not an observer's subjective understanding. 3'
Lacking evidence that the banner was disruptive or "infringed on
anyone's rights,' 32 Justice Stevens wrote that the school, at a
minimum, should have been required to show "that Fredericks's
supposed advocacy stands a meaningful chance of making otherwise-
abstemious students try marijuana." '133 He criticized the majority for
either-he says it is not clear which it did-deferring to the
interpretation of Principal Morse or for making an independent
judgment about the banner's meaning. The first approach "would
permit a listener's perceptions to determine which speech deserved
constitutional protection," an approach he argued was "alien to our
case law.""' As for the Court's conclusion that the banner was
objectively intended to celebrate or encourage drug use, that
conclusion, he argued, "practically refutes itself."'35  Because
Frederick had no intent to encourage anyone to do anything, it is
impossible to impute to him an intention to endorse marijuana use
among his peers. 1
6
Justice Stevens accused the majority of employing a "ham-
handed, categorical approach" that was "deaf to the constitutional
imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school
students.', 3 7 He worried that the majority's decision would have a
chilling effect on debate among students, who might reasonably worry
that their words would be misunderstood by administrators.13 He
also wondered whether "illegal drugs" included alcohol, and whether
"the First Amendment [must] give way whenever a school seeks to
punish a student for any speech mentioning beer, or indeed anything
else that might be deemed risky to teenagers. ' "
131. Id. ("[It is one thing to restrict speech that advocates drug use. It is another thing
entirely to prohibit an obscure message with a drug theme that a third party subjectively-
and not very reasonably-thinks is tantamount to express advocacy.").
132. Id. at 2647. Though he does not pursue it, Justice Stevens questioned whether
this really was school speech. Id. at 2647 n.2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2647-48.
135. Id. at 2649.
136. Id. ("Frederick's credible and uncontradicted explanation for the message-he
just wanted to get on television-is also relevant because a speaker who does not intend to
persuade his audience can hardly be said to be advocating anything.").
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2650.
139. Id.
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B. Student Speech After Morse
In this section, we take up two questions. First, did Morse
answer any of the questions left open by the Tinker trilogy? Second,
what does Morse mean for the scope of students' free speech rights
generally? In Part IV, we will begin to focus specifically on these
questions as they relate to cyberspeech controversies.
1. Clarifying the Tinker Trilogy?
Unfortunately, Morse did not require the Court to answer the
most vexing questions in this area. Specifically, the Court did not
question whether releasing the students to watch the Torch Relay-a
corporate-sponsored, private event-was a school activity akin to a
field trip, so that the school's disciplinary rules applied.' ° Thus the
Court had no occasion to clarify the limits of school administrators'
authority to regulate off-campus speech.
Further, the Court's apparent creation of a categorical "advocacy
of drug use" exception to the First Amendment for public school
students obviated the need to address whether Tinker requires
schools to demonstrate "widespread disruption" before punishing
students for their speech. Instead, the majority made clear that
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and now Morse constitute "exceptions" to, not
applications of, Tinker. This was clear as to Kuhlmeier, but it was not
as clear as to Fraser, as we explain below.' 1
Finally, since it did not apply Tinker, there was no need to
address whether the cryptic reference to speech that collides "with
the rights of others"'4 2 offered an alternative to the "widespread
disruption" standard elsewhere discussed in the opinion. However,
the speed with which the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Harper at least suggests that the Court was not anxious to either take
that question up itself or permit the broad language of the Ninth
Circuit's opinion to serve as precedent for other courts.
So much for what Morse did not do. What it did clarify was the
relationship between Tinker on the one hand, and cases like Fraser
140. Id. at 2622 (majority opinion). At oral argument there was much debate
regarding whether the Torch Relay constituted a school-sponsored event. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 45-58. However, the majority opinion acknowledged
the debate and established early on that the Torch Relay was, in fact, a school-sponsored
event, similar to a field trip. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
141. Nairn, supra note 92, at 239 (agreeing that "the Court opted to fashion merely
another exception to Tinker").
142. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
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and Kuhlmeier on the other. It is now clear that, with Morse, these
three cases form categorical exceptions to whatever free speech rights
students have. Kulhmeier did not apply, according to the majority,
because no one would have thought Frederick's banner to have the
imprimatur of the school.143 As noted above, Kuhlmeier was self-
conscious about its rejection of Tinker's framework. It is less clear,
however, that Fraser was conceived of as an exception, and the
Court's characterization of it as an "alternative" mode of analysis is
somewhat tendentious. The Morse majority's support for holding
Fraser apart from Tinker is a footnote in Kuhlmeier, in which Justice
White wrote, "The decision in Fraser rested on the 'vulgar,' 'lewd,'
and 'plainly offensive' character of a speech delivered at an official
school assembly rather than on any propensity of the speech to
'materially disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others."' 1"44
But Fraser could easily be read as an application of Tinker145 and
there was evidence that is what the Court was doing, at least in part-
why else would the Court have discussed the extent to which Fraser's
speech caused disruption both at the assembly and in classes
afterward?" Justice Brennan referred to the school's legitimate
interest in ensuring that the assembly proceeds in an "orderly
manner."'4 7  Justice Marshall's dissent, moreover, was premised on
the belief that there was no widespread disruption.'" In any event,
143. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627.
144. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n4 (1988) (alteration in
original) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
145. Lower courts have often interpreted the Fraser opinion as carving out a distinct
realm of student speech over which schools have a broad authority to regulate. See, e.g.,
Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that under
Fraser "schools have wide discretion to prohibit speech that is less than obscene-to wit,
vulgar, lewd, indecent, or plainly offensive"); Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220
F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding the school's right to categorically prohibit
"offensive speech" as stated in Fraser); Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728,
737-38 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that Fraser gives school's "the authority to determine that
vulgar and lewd speech ... would undermine the school's basic educational mission");
Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (finding
that Fraser permits a school broad leeway to "prohibit lewd or vulgar, viewpoint neutral
language when such language undermines the school's basic educational mission").
However, we argue that the Fraser Court actually applied the Tinker standard, providing
an example of what constitutes a material disruption, justifying school regulation. See
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678.
146. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 (discussing the disruption).
147. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
14& Id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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since Kuhlmeier declined to apply Tinker at all, the Court's
observations about the relationship of Fraser to Tinker are dicta. At
the very least, they hardly represented thorough consideration of the
question, and Morse should have justified its conclusion
independently, instead of by rote citation.
Even as the Court clarified Fraser's status as recognizing a
categorical exception, the Court did not shed much light on its scope.
The Court merely acknowledged that Fraser considered both the
content and the fact Fraser's speech was delivered at a school
assembly,149 but, later in the Morse opinion, refused to read Fraser as
authorizing discipline for "offensive" speech, broadly conceived.'
The majority's description of Fraser, however, suggests that it might
read Fraser as permitting schools to punish sexually suggestive or
sexually explicit speech, at least in a classroom or a school assembly
setting.5'
In sum, after Morse, we think student speech rights can be
pictured as follows:
Student Speech after Morse v. Frederick
Unprotected Protected
* On-campus speech causing * Otherwise protected speech
widespread disruption made off school grounds and
not part of school activity or
* Sexually suggestive or sexually otherwise bearing the school's
explicit speech in classes or in imprimatur
school assemblies
Non-disruptive, on-campus
* Speech bearing the school's speech not otherwise
imprimatur from which the unprotected (including speech
school wishes to disassociate administrators merely find
itself offensive)
* On-campus speech advocating
or celebrating the use of illegal
drugs
149. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626-27 (2007).
150. Id. at 2629.
151. Id. at 2626 (quoting Fraser's characterization of the speech as "an elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" and "offensively lewd and indecent," then
contrasting "the sexual content" of Fraser's speech with the "political 'message' of the
armbands in Tinker").
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2. Further Observations on Morse
More so than in previous student speech cases, the majority (and
the dissent) are explicit that the rights of public school students at
school are different than either those of adults or those of students
not on school property.152 When coupled with many of the Justices'
sympathy for the plight of teachers and administrators who must
attempt to maintain a safe and orderly learning environment for
students in their care,'53 the overall tone of the opinion is one of
deference to those administrators "on the ground" who must make
quick decisions when confronted with certain student expression.'54
This may encourage lower courts to be deferential as well; or at least
signal approval to those who have deferred to administrators in close
cases.
What might be called the "categorization" of student speech,
confirmed in Morse, is an interesting development. As critics have
noted, the process of excluding entire categories of speech from First
Amendment protection because of their content sits uneasily beside
the tendency of the Court to treat content-based restrictions of
speech as presumptively unconstitutional, absent proof of a
compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring.' Morse
152. Id. at 2622, 2624. The majority opinion clearly states that a student's free speech
rights are not "automatically coextensive" with adults' rights. Id. at 2622. In addition,
although the Court finds the Torch Relay to constitute a school-sponsored event, the
Court also recognizes that "[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when
courts should apply school-speech precedents" to speech occurring off-campus and at non-
school-related activities. Id. at 2624. In a nod to the majority, the dissent also recognizes
"that the relationship between schools and students 'is custodial and tutelary, permitting a
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults."' Id. at
2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655
(1995)). The dissent also acknowledged the limits of a school to regulate student speech
occurring off-campus; however, the dissent found the characterization of the Torch Relay
as a school-sponsored event to be questionable at best. See id. at 2647 n.2.
153. See id. at 2629 (majority opinion) (holding that the principal had "to decide to
act-or not act-on the spot" and that a failure to act could "send a powerful message to
students in her charge" about the school's drug policy); id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that by their very nature, students
will test the limits of school discipline and that administrators "need a degree of flexible
authority to respond to [those] disciplinary challenges").
154. The only dissonant note is found in Justice Alito's opinion, which warns against
forgetting that school administrators are not their students' biological parents and are, in
fact, agents of the state. Id. at 2637-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
155. See Jerry C. Chiang, Plainly Offensive Babel: An Analytical Framework for
Regulating Plainly Offensive Speech in Public Schools, 82 WASH. L. REV. 403, 409-10
(2007) (providing three factors by which to categorize student speech and determine
whether or not it may be lawfully regulated by the school); Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck,
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compounds the problem by creating a viewpoint-based exception, not
merely a content-based one: Only speech that encourages or
celebrates the use of illegal drugs is punished; speech that denigrates
drug use ("BONG HiTS R 4 LOSERS"?) is presumably permissible.
Excluding entire categories of speech has been justified either by
concluding the speech in question was remote from the real concerns
of the First Amendment 156 or that the consequences of permitting
such speech was inimical to the good order of society.157 Admittedly,
the Court has not exactly been thorough in its justifications of
categorical exclusions, but it did feel compelled to make them.
Morse's explanation was equally cursory. Chief Justice Roberts
seemed content to argue that schools and drugs are different, citing
the Court's readiness to create a similar exception to the Fourth
Amendment in its drug search and drug testing jurisprudence, as well
as the attention (and funds) that Congress has lavished on fighting
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1762 (2007) (dividing school speech into three categories:
"Tinker-type, Fraser-type, and Kuhlmeier-type"); 0. Lee Reed, Is Commercial Speech
Really Less Valuable Than Political Speech? On Replacing Values and Categories in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 3-14 (1996) (providing historical analysis
and reasoning surrounding free speech jurisprudence and its categorical exceptions);
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 298 (1995)
(discussing why the Supreme Court has held that "some kinds of speech have less value
than others"); R. Scott Shieldes, Comment, Suturing Discourses Within the First
Amendment, 34 HOuS. L. REV. 1531, 1533-51 (1998) (providing a road map of the current
categorical exclusions in the First Amendment pertaining to speech). Compare Edward J.
Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in America, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1212-13 (1994) (concluding that the government should refrain
from regulating categories of speech at all and instead focus on the conduct underlying the
speech in order to find justification for punishment).
156. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 20 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Fairman,
supra note 155, at 1731-32 (discussing the history of regulating speech falling outside the
protection of the First Amendment); Richard Salgado, Protecting Student Speech Rights
While Increasing School Safety: School Jurisdiction and the Search for Warning Signs in a
Post-Columbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1385-86 (2005)
(providing reasoning and support for the categories of speech unprotected by the First
Amendment).
157. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (reaffirming that "true threats"
do not receive free speech protection under the First Amendment); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (finding obscenity "utterly without redeeming social
importance"); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (upholding sentence
enhancements for "hate crimes"). See also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western
N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 373 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774
(1994); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
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drug abuse in schools."' Only Justice Alito seemed to feel that more
was necessary. An exception was justified, according to him, because
drugs posed a real, physical danger to students; and that prevention of
physical harm to students in its charge was the prime directive of
public schools.'59
Justice Alito's analogy seems to us more important than the
portions of his opinion attempting to limit the majority's holding. As
Justices Breyer and Stevens (as well as early commentators) noted,"6
the majority's exception is, by itself, not easily cabined. First,
Juneau's policy encompassed "illegal substances," which would
include, for minors, alcohol and tobacco. Whatever arguments there
may be for treating all drugs equally, right off the bat the majority's
opinion would sanction a school policy banning, for example, clothing
with the brands of alcohol or tobacco manufacturers on them, if
having such logos on clothing could be deemed "endorsement" or
"celebration" of either alcohol or tobacco."'
158. Some would say that this is simply further evidence of the warping effect the "war
on drugs" has had on constitutional doctrine. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
(concluding that application of Controlled Substance Act to local, non-commercial
production and possession of marijuana pursuant to state law permitting production and
possession for medicinal purposes did not exceed congressional power under the Commerce
Clause); Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose,
9 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 751 (2005); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a
Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507, 508 (2006) (calling the
Raich decision a "watershed moment in the development of judicial federalism").
159. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring). But see Nairn, supra note 92, at
252 (arguing that the Court "failed to sufficiently distinguish drug abuse from other
purported dangers to students").
160. Justice Breyer finds holes in the majority's reasoning, stating that "it is unclear
how far the Court's rule regarding drug advocacy extends." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2639
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("What about a
conversation during the lunch period where one student suggests that glaucoma sufferers
should smoke marijuana to relieve the pain? What about deprecating commentary about
an antidrug film shown in school? And what about drug messages mixed with other, more
expressly political, content?"). The dissent also finds fault with "the breathtaking sweep
of [the majority's] opinion" and suggests that under the Court's reasoning, a student could
be punished for "mentioning beer, or indeed anything else that might be deemed risky to
teenagers." Id. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (punctuation altered).
161. Denning's own high school, Apollo High School, in Owensboro, Kentucky, had
such a policy banning "alcohol-themed" clothing, which worked a hardship on students
during the heyday of Bud Lite's "Spuds McKenzie" marketing campaign. The irony was
that Apollo High School itself used, as its mascot, the Anheuser-Busch "A" with an eagle.
Denning distinctly remembers his second-grade class writing letters to Anheuser-Busch on
behalf of AHS for permission to use its logo. The irony of this was lost on the Assistant
Principal charged with enforcing the dress code.
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Justice Alito's resort to analogy could further encourage a broad
reading of Morse. If it is true that one of schools' primary functions is
to keep students safe from physical harm while outside their parents'
care, then all manner of speech encouraging or celebrating activities
that are physically dangerous-from driving fast to having sex-is
potentially the subject of a similar categorical exclusion. Justice
Alito's concern with physical safety could ratify schools'
overreactions-spurred by events at Columbine High School and
Virginia Tech-to perceived threats of violence to other students or
to the school in general. Currently, the Court has announced that to
be excluded from First Amendment protection, a threat must be a
"true" threat, made with the intent to put another in fear of being the
subject of violence.'62 One could easily imagine schools relaxing this
requirement in light of Justice Alito's concurring opinion. As we note
below, this has important consequences for the regulation of student
Internet speech, given the rising concern over so-called
"cyberbullying" among school-age children.
The gradual expansion of these categories is made all the more
likely by Morse's strong indications that school officials should be
given the benefit of the doubt by courts. 63  Solicitude for
administrators having to make split-second decisions on the spot is
probably better expressed by granting them qualified immunity than
by immunizing their decisions from First Amendment review
altogether. But the deferential tone of the Court's opinion might
encourage lower courts to do likewise, resulting in more room for
administrators to suppress speech not to their liking.
While much of the above is speculation, we are certain of one
thing: after Morse's synthesis of the Court's school speech cases,
school administrators will have multiple bites at the apple when it
comes to suppressing student speech.' 64 First, they can argue that
162. Black, 538 U.S. at 359 ("'True threats' encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.").
163. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 (recognizing the difficult and important role that a
principal plays and finding the principal's actions in this case "reasonable"); id. at 2639
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that a
teacher or principal probably knows best "when a student has gone too far"); Nairn, supra
note 92, at 255 (arguing that Morse will be difficult to limit because it "defers to school
officials' reasonable determinations of what constitutes prohibitable speech").
164. For a similar assessment, see Nairn, supra note 92, at 239 (predicting that despite
"the Court's apparent confidence in the limited scope of its ruling" Morse was "likely to
significantly increase the ability of schools to impose content-based restrictions on student
speech").
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student speech fits within one of the three excluded categories; failing
that, they can fall back on Tinker's "widespread disruption"
justification. Further, though it has not yet born much fruit,
suppressing speech to protect the "rights of other students" remains a
wild card in this area.
IV. Morse and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech
Morse may have the most significance for a subject that it did not
even discuss, at least not directly: the ability of schools to monitor and
discipline online speech. This Part describes the recent proliferation
of controversies over student cyberspeech, schools' reactions to it,
and includes a survey of the reported lower court cases on the subject.
Here the pressing questions are whether schools may punish students
for off-campus speech and whether cyberspeech having effects inside
the school is subject to the school's jurisdiction. Finally, we ask what,
if any, light Morse shines on issues particular to student cyberspeech
cases.
A. Cyberspace: The New Frontier for Student Speech Cases
The technological savvy of school-age students (and some adults'
corresponding lack thereof), the proliferation of social networking
sites such as MySpace and Facebook, hardware like camera phones
with web access and text messaging capabilities, and the peculiar
features of online communication165 have combined to produce an
entirely new set of concerns for students, parents, and school
administrators. The concern over child predators is not a new one,
even online, although social networking sites have presented
additional opportunities for inappropriate contact between adults and
minors."6 The new concern is protecting children from their peers.
School districts across the country are having to address
"cyberbullying," which can mean anything from rude comments left
165. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Flame First, Think Later: New Clues to E-mail
Misbehavior, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at F5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/20/health/psychology/20essa.html (describing "online disinhibition effect").
166. See Matt Apuzzo, Teens at Risk on Web Sites, Experts Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 19, 2006, available at http://www.colonialhts.net/intemet-safety/
Teens at riskABCNewsAP2-19-2006.pdf (describing cases in Connecticut and New
Jersey in which teens were harmed by adults met through social networking sites).
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on MySpace pages, to harassment via e-mail, or the wide
dissemination of private (sometimes embarrassing) information.67
Other common cases involve students posting comments critical
of school administrators and teachers to personal webpages or social
networking sites, resulting in discipline. Since 2000, for example, the
First Amendment Center has featured numerous stories on its
website of students being disciplined for making critical comments
about their school,' 6' teachers and administrators,' and other
students.7°
167. See Anne Marie Chaker, Schools Act to Short-Circuit Spread of 'Cyberbullying,'
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007, at Dl; Jeff Chu, You Wanna Take This Online?, TIME, Aug. 1,
2005, at 52; Amy Harmon, Internet Gives Teenage Bullies Weapons to Wound from Afar,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at Al; States Stand Up to Cyberbullies, CNN.coM (last visited
Feb. 21, 2007); Kate Taylor, You've Got Hate Mail: Cyberbullying, in Which Schoolkids
Anonymously Spread Gossip Online, Is an Epidemic Authorities Find Hard to Stop,
OREGONIAN (Portland, OR), Mar. 22, 2005, at E01.
168. See Associated Press, N.J. School Rapped for Punishing Student over Web Site,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/news.aspx?id=15073 (student "had created a Web site where he wrote about hating his
middle school"); Associated Press, Student Suspended for MySpace Postings Returns to
School, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16526 (student suspended for "satirical comment
on the poor physical condition of the school, the behavior and demographics of students
and staff, lack of resources and the perceived racial biases of teachers and
administrators"); Associated Press, Teen Webmaster Sues After N.J. District Punishes Him
for Site, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Dec. 21, 2003, http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/ news.aspx?id=12381.
169. See Associated Press, A CL U: Ohio Teen Wrongly Expelled for Exercising Free Speech,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, May 9, 2004, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?
id=13317(student expelled for site that "included images of teachers and a message board with
posting aimed at the school and individual administrators"); Associated Press, Oregon Teen
Expelled over Off-Color Web Site Sues School District, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Jan. 25,
2003, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=3033 (student website "contained
obscenity-laden pokes at Canadians, lesbians, classmates and teachers"); Associated Press,
Pennsylvania High Court Upholds Student's Expulsion over Web Site, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER, Sept. 27, 2002, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=3381 (student's
"'Teacher Sux' Web site ridiculed algebra teacher Kathleen Fulmer's physical characteristics
and teaching abilities and included a solicitation for money to pay for a hit man"); Associated
Press, School Violated Ex-Volleyball Player's Free-Speech Rights, Federal Judge Rules, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, Feb. 28, 2003, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/news.aspx?id=6403 (student was "thrown off the volleyball team for posting an Internet
message critical of a teacher").
170. See Associated Press, Court Sides with Teens Punished for Web Sites' Content,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Feb. 27, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/news.aspx?id=14885 (students suspended for alleged hateful comments "after a parent
complained about the way athletes and band members were portrayed on the Web sites");
Associated Press, N.Y. District Attorney Won't Prosecute High Schoolers over Web Site,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, June 16, 2001, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/news.aspx?id=4952 (discussing decision not to prosecute "[tlwo Chappaqua high
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The ability of students to criticize one another and teachers, and
the ubiquity of means to do so-through computers, Blackberries,
phones with text messaging capabilities-combined with the
perceived severity of the threat to good order in the schools have left
schools scrambling for responses.171 That no one knows quite where
the limits to the school's authority lie only complicates decisions for
teachers and administrators, as well as for students who are "caught
off guard when they are punished" for things written on "their"
websites.17 Private school administrators, since they are unaffected
by the First Amendment, can simply ban students from, for example,
using MySpace or Facebook.13 Public school coaches can also use the
continued ability to engage in extracurricular activities as leverage."
Devising policies to regulate the general student population of public
schools, however, is a different (and more difficult) proposition.
One recent article described a principal's decision to ask parents
and students "to sign an agreement that included a commitment to
monitor their children's computer use at home to prevent cyber-
bullying, online gossip and the use of obscene and profane
language." '175 But she worried that she probably "overstepped [her]
bounds" in doing so.176 Some school districts are either using existing
student conduct codes to police online behavior having an effect at
school, or specifically crafting new policies designed to put students
on notice that off-campus expressive activity can have on-campus
consequences. 77  Other districts have taken a more cautious
school boys who allegedly operated an Internet site that listed girls' sexual secrets"
noting that the site was shut down and the boys were disciplined).
171. See Alan Gomez, Students, Officials Locking Horns over Blogs; What Is Posted
from Home Brings Punishment at School, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2006, at 8D; Sherry
Saavedra, Student Use of MySpace Presents a Quandary; Schools Weigh Control vs. First
Amendment, UNION-TRIBUNE (San Diego, CA), June 4, 2006, at Al; Paula Reed Ward,
Free Speech Meets Internet; Schools Perceive Threat to Authority, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 2006, at B1.
172. Gomez, supra note 171, at 8D.
173. Chaker, supra note 167, at D4 ("At Pope John XXIII High School in Sparta, N.J.,
principal Msgr. Kieran McHugh aims to keep it simple. He outright banned the use of
MySpace last school year after hearing about students posting content he considered
inappropriate.").
174. Saavedra, supra note 171, at Al ("Many coaches at schools are upfront about
patrolling the MySpace pages of players and have put student athletes on notice: Online
evidence of drinking alcohol, using drugs or making vulgar gestures can lead to suspension
from the team.").
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Chaker, supra note 167, at Al; Saavedra, supra note 170, at Al.
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approach, adopting the position that off-campus speech is outside
their purview. ' Still other school officials-citing First Amendment
concerns-have even declined to notify parents of online content
involving their children of which officials become aware, even if the
school is not trying to punish the students.79
B. Lower Court Cases Involving Regulation of Cyberspeech
Perhaps reflecting the fluid nature of school responses to student
Internet speech, there are only a handful of reported cases involving
students and the Internet.'" The facts of these cases are substantially
similar. In many cases students created websites at home that
contained remarks about their school, their teachers, other students,
or administrators that were found objectionable. School officials
often disciplined these students with suspensions or expulsions (or
both). In many cases, the reactions could charitably be termed
overreactions, less charitably as punitive retaliation. Closer cases
involved postings that were misconstrued or misperceived by others
as threats.
In most cases, the students prevailed; in many cases the judge
awarded injunctive relief, finding a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits that the student's First Amendment rights were violated
by school officials. In general, the courts grappled with the same
questions posed in non-Internet student speech cases-how to
reconcile Tinker with Fraser and Kuhlmeier, whether Fraser created
an "exception" for low value speech,'8' and the like.
178. See Cynthia L. Garza, Discipline for Internet Threats Proves Difficult for School,
FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville, Fla), Sept. 26, 2003, at Al (describing threat
posted by one student on a social network site and decision of school not to punish
because the school didn't "have jurisdiction over the Internet").
179. Saavedra, supra note 171, at Al (describing school board decision not to notify
parents after officials became aware of online photographs taken by girls "off campus
[displaying] themselves in provocative poses and in their underwear"; quoting the
principal as questioning whether "it's the school's job to alert parents that are clearly
outside the school province.... The last thing we want to do is infringe on somebody's
First Amendment rights.").
180. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502 (W.D.
Pa. 2006); Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A. 05-1076, 2005 WL 2106562
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002);
Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No.
415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d
847 (Pa. 2002).
181. Compare Layshock, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (asserting that Fraser and Kuhlmeier
constitute alternatives for regulation for low-value or school-sponsored speech, with
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But the nature of the Internet does seem to pose special
difficulties when attempting to ascertain whether speech occurred
"in" school or "on" school property 8 and how "disruptive" that
speech had to be, assuming that it was subject to the regulation of
school officials.8 3 The courts' resolutions of those questions will be
the focus of this subsection. The following subsection will address
whether Morse provides lower courts with guidance for future cases.
1. Cyberspeech as "On-Campus" Speech
Can a website created by a student at home, on his or her time,
using his equipment, and likely saved to a non-school server ever be
on-campus speech? This can be the most vexing problem for
administrators. A number of courts have held that the answer is
"no," even if the website is accessed by the student at school and
shown to other students.
In Mahaffey v. Aldrich,'" for example, a high school student
(Mahaffey) was disciplined for his contribution to a friend's website
entitled "Satan's web page." Mahaffey's contribution included an
apparently tongue-in-cheek "mission" from Satan to, inter alia, "Stab
someone for no reason then set them on fire throw them off a cliff,
watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before everything
goes black, spit on their face.' '185  This mission was followed by a
disclaimer that read in part, "PS: NOW THAT YOU'VE READ MY
WEB PAGE PLEASE DON'T GO KILLING PEOPLE AND
STUFF THEN AND BLAMING IT ON ME. OK?""' A student
Tinker's "disruption" analysis being the default rule), with Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at
783-84 (discussing Tinker only).
182. See Layshock, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 507 ("This case began with purely out-of-school
conduct which subsequently carried over into the school setting."); Latour, 2005 WL
2106562, at *1; Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (beginning analysis with the question
whether speech occurred on school property); Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (same); J.S., 807
A.2d at 864 ("[A] threshold issue regarding the 'location' of the speech must be resolved
to determine if the unique concerns regarding the school environment are even
implicated, i.e., is it on campus speech or purely off-campus speech?").
183. See Layshock, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (addressing "disruptive" nature of speech);
Latour, 2005 WL 2106562, at *2 (same); Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (same); Coy, 205
F. Supp. 2d at 800 (same); Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (same); J.S., 807 A.2d at 869
(same).
184. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
185. Id. at 782.
186. Id.
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notified police about the webpage and the school first suspended,
then began proceedings to expel Mahaffey.18
Despite an admission by the student that school computers "may
have" been used to create the website," the district court was
extremely skeptical that the school had authority to discipline the
speech. "The only evidence.., in support of activity occurring on
school property... is Plaintiff's equivocal statement made to an
investigating police officer .... [T]he evidence simply doesn't
establish that any of the complained of conduct occurred on [school]
property."'89
Similarly, in Coy v. Board of Education,'9° a student (Coy) was
suspended, then expelled for 80 days after school officials became
aware of a website Coy created that "purported to describe the
exploits of a group of skate boarders who called themselves 'NBP."' 1 9'
The site also featured pictures of Coy and his friends making obscene
gestures and rude remarks about "losers" who also attended the
school." The site also contained "some profanity, and," the judge
ruefully noted, "a depressingly high number of spelling and
grammatical errors." '193
In deciding how to characterize the speech, the court noted that
the website was created by Coy "on his home computer, and.., on
his own time. No part of his website was created using school
equipment or during school hours."'1 94 The evidence suggests that he
did access it at school after administrators were aware of the site's
existence.9  But, the judge continued, "they had no evidence that he
had displayed the information contained in the website to any other
student. Unlike Fraser, there was no evidence that he compelled 600
other students to view his website.... The extent of Jon Coy's
expressive activity was the private viewing of his own website."'96
187. Id. at 782-83.
188. Id. at 782, 784.
189. Id. at 784.
190. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
191. Id. at 795.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 795
195. Id. at 795-96.
196. Id. at 799. A footnote mentions that Coy did show one other student the website
while at school, but school officials did not know that when they disciplined him. Id. n.3.
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Finally, there is Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415,"7
where-in what can only be described as a terrible
misunderstanding-a student (Emmett) was suspended after creating
what was misreported by the local news as a "hit list," in reality a site
on which were posted mock "obituaries" of at least two of Emmett's
friends."' He was apparently inspired "by a creative writing class ...
in which students were assigned to write their own obituary."' 9
Emmett "allowed visitors to the web site to vote on who would 'die'
next-that is, who would be the subject of the next mock obituary."2'
After the aforementioned local-news-inspired freak-out, Emmett
took down the website, but not early enough to avoid discipline by
school officials. He was told he was placed on "emergency expulsion
for intimidation, harassment, disruption to the educational process,
and violation of the Kent School District copyright."' ' Cooler heads
prevailed-to a degree-and his expulsion was reduced to a five-day
suspension, which included a prohibition on practicing and playing
with his basketball team, which had an upcoming playoff game."
The student sought a preliminary injunction against the school,
which the court granted. Addressing the likelihood of success on the
merits, the court noted that "Plaintiff's speech was not at a school
assembly [nor was it] produced in connection with any class or school
project" and "[a]lthough the intended audience was undoubtedly
connected to [the school], the speech was entirely outside of the
school's supervision or control.""2 3 Given the fact that there was no
"threat" to anyone, as well as the "out-of-school nature of the
speech," the judge concluded that it was quite likely the threatened
discipline violated the student's free speech rights."'
Other courts have regarded speech that finds its way into the
school-however it happens-as "on-campus" speech. In a recent
197. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
198. Id. at 1089. ("On Wednesday, February 16, an evening television news story
characterized Plaintiff's web site as featuring a 'hit list' of people to be killed, although the
words 'hit list' appear nowhere on the web site.").
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1090.
204. Id.
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case, Layshock v. Hermitage School District,2 5 a judge denied a
temporary restraining order to a student (Layshock) subjected to
fairly severe discipline 216 for creating a MySpace parody site for his
high school principal that was no doubt crude and likely embarrassing
to the principal."" Layshock "created the parody by using his
grandmother's computer during non-school hours; no school
resources were used to create the parody," except for a photo
cropped from the school's official website.21 Proud of his handiwork,
Layshock informed a few friends "and eventually word of the parody
(as well as a few other more vulgar parodies of unknown origin) soon
reached most, if not all, of the student body. ... "' As the court put
it, "[t]his case began with purely out-of-school conduct which
subsequently carried over into the school setting., 2'0  The judge
declined to accept Layshock's characterization of the speech as
"purely off campus," and concluded it was unlikely the student would
prevail on the merits of his First Amendment claim.
Similarly, in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,"2
the fact that a student website was accessed (though not to the degree
that Layshock's was) at school, even though it was not created there,
prompted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to regard the site as on-
campus speech.2 3  In J.S., a student (J.S.) had created a website
devoted to ridiculing the student's algebra teacher and his school's
principal .2  The site, entitled "Teacher Sux," was comprised,
205. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502 (W.D. Pa.
2006).
206. In addition to a ten-day out-of-school suspension, the school placed the student in
the Alternative Curriculum Education program for the duration of the year, banned him
from attending or participating in school-sponsored events, and prohibited him from
participating in the graduation ceremony. Id. at 505.
207. The page "was created by using the website's template for profiles, which allows
website users to fill in background information and include answers to specific questions.
Justin's answers to the questions centered on the theme of 'big.' The answers range from
nonsensical answers to silly questions, on the one hand, to crude juvenile language, on the
other." Id. at 504. "For example, in response to the question 'in the past month have you
smoked,' the website says 'big blunt.' In response to a question regarding alcohol use, the
parody says 'big keg behind my desk."' Id. at 504-05.
208. Id. at 505.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 507.
211. Id. at 508.
212. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
213. Id. at 865.
214. Id. at 851
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according to the court, "of a number of web pages that made
derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening comments....",15
While the website had numerous "disclaimers" purporting to ensure
the site was not accessed by teachers or employees and "contracts" by
which users promised not to disclose the site or its creator's identity
to school officials, 6 the student told other students about the site and
showed it to one student at school. That student alerted school
officials, but, curiously, J.S.'s troubles began only after the end of that
school year, when the school announced its intention to suspend the
student first for three, then ten days, and then initiated expulsion
proceedings against him for threatening a teacher.1 7
The Pennsylvania high court first recognized that "a threshold
issue regarding the 'location' of the speech at issue must be resolved
to determine if the unique concerns regarding the school environment
are even implicated, i.e., is it on campus or purely off-campus
speech? ,2"8 But the court's use of the word "purely" was a giveaway;
it concluded that "[w]hile there is no dispute that the web site was
created off-campus, the record clearly reflects that the off-campus
web site was accessed by [the student] and shown to a fellow
student., 21 9 Moreover, as noted above, he told others about the site,
and faculty members and administrators accessed the site once they
became aware of it.2' Since the web site was about specific teachers
and, as the court concluded, "it was inevitable that the contents of the
web site would pass from students to teachers, inspiring circulation of
the web page on school property," it was deemed on-campus
speech . 1
The court concluded that "where speech [1] that is aimed at a
specific school and/or its personnel is [2] brought onto the school
campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be
considered on-campus speech. 2 22 In a footnote, the court added that
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 852.
218. Id. at 864. The first issue the court dealt with extensively was whether the
material on the website was a "true threat" against Mrs. Fulmer, which would have placed
it outside the protection of the First Amendment altogether. The court concluded that
nothing on the website constituted a threat. Id. at 859-60.
219. Id. at 865.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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while the fact that the speech was accessed personally by the student
was "a strong factor in [its] assessment," the court did not "discount
that one who posts school-targeted material in a manner known to be
freely accessible from school grounds may run the risk of being
deemed to have engaged in on-campus speech, where actual accessing
by others in fact occurs," but left the final determination of such
questions to "the totality of the circumstances involved."'
2. "Disruptive" Cyberspeech
Even in cases in which a court seems disposed to limit schools'
authority over off-campus speech, an inquiry is made into the
disruptive nature of the speech. Lacking guidance on the on-
campus/off-campus question, a natural response is to look at whether
the speech was actually disruptive to the school. If not, then even
under Tinker it cannot be sanctioned. But here too, courts'
thresholds for the requisite disruptiveness vary.
The district court's ruling on Josh Mahaffey's contribution to
24
"Satan's web page," is an example of such alternative reasoning.
His speech was deemed beyond the control of school officials, even
assuming it was on-campus speech, because there was "no evidence
that the website interfered with the work of the school or that any
other student's rights were impinged., 225 The court concluded that
"Defendants' regulation of Plaintiff's speech on the website without
any proof of disruption to the school or on campus activity in the
creation of the website was a violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment
rights. ,,226
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District227 -apparently the
first reported case on the subject-a Missouri district court granted a
preliminary injunction to a student suspended for creating a webpage
223. Id. n.12. The J.S. court, as well as the district court in Layshock, seemed to be
influenced by Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa.
2001), in which a court declined to apply a heightened standard of review to discipline of a
student for a hard copy of an emailed "top 10" list containing vulgar statements about the
high school athletic director that was circulated at the school. According to the court,
"[t]he overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech (whether on or off
campus) in accordance with Tinker. Furthermore, because the... list was brought on
campus, albeit by unknown persons, Tinker applies." Id. at 455.
224. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
225. Id.; see also id. at 785 ("There is no... evidence of disruption on the record
before this Court.").
226. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
227. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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containing "criticism of the high school" expressed in "crude and
vulgar language."2  The website was created by the student
(Beussink) at home using his computer.229 It came to the attention of
school officials after a falling out with a friend who told teachers
about the website.' Upon viewing the website, the principal testified
that he "immediately" decided to discipline Beussink because of the
site's content. 231 There was conflicting testimony as to how many
other students saw the site at school, but "there was no evidence that
Beussink showed the homepage to other students." '232 In any event,
even the students that did see the website did not disrupt classes as a
result, according to the court's findings.233 In fact, it appeared to the
court that the principal simply didn't like what Beussink had posted
on the webpage and disciplined him because of it.2 ' That, the court
concluded, "is not an acceptable justification for limiting student
speech under Tinker." 35
And in Coy, while the court denied summary judgment because
of disputed facts surrounding the reason for Coy's suspension, the
judge noted that "[tihe extent of Jon Coy's expressive activity was the
private viewing of his own website. '' 236  Distinguishing cases like
Fraser and Kuhlmeier, the court noted that Coy's "activity was not
even akin to putting up a poster in a school hallway." ' The access of
his website at school was, by design, furtive and concealed. 3
Specifically, "no evidence suggests that Coy's acts in accessing the
website had any effect upon the school district's ability to maintain
discipline in the school., 239
228. Id. at 1177.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1177-78.
231. Id. at 1178.
232. Id. at 1178-79. Some of the other students who viewed the webpage, in fact, did
so because their teacher allowed them to look at it. Id. at 1179.
233. Id at 1179.
234. Id. at 1180 ("Principal Poorman's own testimony indicates he disciplined Beussink
because he was upset by the content of the homepage.").
235. Id.
236. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 800.
239. Id. at 801. Although not directly on point, the district court in Killion v. Franklin
Regional School District, 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001), first looked at evidence
regarding disruption, reasoning that, under Tinker, if the speech wasn't disruptive, it
couldn't be punished, assuming it was "in school" speech. Even if he had produced similar
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In the two cases, however, in which courts did uphold school
discipline, courts also tended to sidestep the on-campus/off-campus
speech question by either broadly defining on-campus speech, as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did,2 ° or by assuming arguendo First
Amendment protection, then looking at disruptive effects. The
results reached by these courts indicate that substantial differences of
opinion can exist with regard to what constitutes "disruption."
In J.S., for example, the webpage mocking the algebra teacher,
Mrs. Fulmer, and Principal Kartsotis, was held to constitute
substantial disruption because of its effects on Mrs. Fulmer. The
principal informed Mrs. Fulmer of the contents of the site, which
include a list of reasons why Mrs. Fulmer should die,241 and a mock
solicitation of donations for a hit man. Even though law enforcement
officials concluded that no laws were broken and that Mrs. Fulmer
was in no danger,
After viewing the site, Mrs. Fulmer testified that she was
frightened, fearing someone would try to kill her. Mrs. Fulmer
suffered stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of
weight, and a general sense of loss of well-being as a result of
viewing the web site. She suffered from short-term memory
loss and an inability to go out of the house and mingle with
crowds. Mrs. Fulmer suffered headaches and was required to
take anti-anxiety/anti-depressant medication.
Furthermore, Mrs. Fulmer was unable to return to school to
finish the school year .... As a result of Mrs. Fulmer's inability
to return to work, the school was forced to utilize three
substitute teachers, which disrupted the educational process of
the students.2
lists in the past, and was warned against bringing them to school, the court concluded that
the defendants had not
presented any evidence that [the student's] earlier lists had caused disruption
which would have supported a belief that substantial disruption would follow
from the [latest] list. At best, defendants ... offered evidence that [the subject of
the latest list] was upset and had a hard time doing his job and that the librarian
(the subject of the [earlier] Book Nazi list) was almost in tears.... However,
these do not rise to the level of substantial disruption.
Id. at 455-56.
240. See supra notes 212-223 and accompanying text (discussing J.S. ex rel. H.S. v.
Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002)).
241. See J.S., 807 A.2d at 851 (describing section of site entitled "Why Should She
Die," along with pages entitled "Mrs. Fulmer is a B[itch], In D Minor" and "Fuck] You
Mrs. Fulmer. You Are A B[itch]. You Are A Stupid B[itch].").
242. Id. at 852.
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As if that weren't enough, the court found that "[t]he website
also had a demoralizing impact on the school community." 24'3 The
principal compared the effect on student and staff morale "to the
death of a student or staff member."2 At no time, however, did the
school district request that the student take down the website or
attempt to punish him until the following school year.245
While the court recognized that "there must be more than some
mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech... complete chaos
is not required for a school district to punish student speech."2 46 To
the court, the need to hire multiple replacements, as well as the fact
that the site "disrupted the entire school community-teachers,
students and parents," the most direct example being "the direct and
indirect impact of the emotional and physical injuries to Mrs.
Fulmer," sufficed. 247 The court also confidently concluded that the
site "was specifically aimed at this particular school district and
seemed designed to create precisely this sort of upheaval., 248 Thus, it
concluded Tinker permitted the punishment meted out to the site's
creator.
In Layshock, the court assumed that the MySpace parody was
expressive activity and was governed by Tinker, because the website
was available to and was accessed by other students at school. The
court there, too, found that it caused a substantial disruption. Both
Layshock's parody and the other parodies he did not create (which
were apparently more vulgar) "were accessed incessantly by
students" at the high school, resulting in "the school [shutting] down
its computer system to student use" for five days. 249 "The lack of
access.., caused the cancellation of several classes and interfered
with students' ability to use the computers for their school-intended
purposes., 250 Further, the school IT person spent a quarter of his time
dealing with issues arising from attempts to block access to the
parodies from school.25
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 868.
247. Id. at 869.
248. Id.
249. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (W.D.
Pa. 2006).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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"It appears," the court concluded, "as though the entire student
body.., was abuzz about the profiles, who created them, and how
they could be accessed.252 Teachers were monitoring the comments of
students and reporting students to the Principal's office."5 3 The co-
principal "testified that he dedicated at least 25% to 30% of his time
to dealing with the disruptions and the investigation into the source of
the parodies., 254 The court held that Layshock's actions "appear to
have substantially disrupted school operations and interfered with the
rights of others" and that he would not likely prevail on the merits of
his First Amendment claim.z5
V. Student Cyberspeech and the First Amendment:
A Suggested Approach
In this Part, we combine both the lessons of Morse and of the
lower courts addressing this issue to offer a suggested framework for
courts facing student cyberspeech issues. It is our hope as well that
such a framework would provide useful guidance for administrators.
Because such a framework is difficult to articulate in the abstract, we
have created, in Part B, some "test suites, 256 containing fact situations
covering a range of Internet-based expressive activity. Our examples
are intended to run the gamut from activity school administrators
could clearly suppress or discipline to that which is likely outside their
ability to regulate, and includes several situations in which their
authority is uncertain. The application of our suggested principles in
Part C will be primarily concerned with these gray areas.
We begin, however, with the principles that inform the resolution
of the test suits. Those we have derived from both the Court's
student speech cases, as well as the best approaches of the lower
courts that have specifically ruled on student cyberspeech claims.
A. Guiding Principles
It is clear, both from the Supreme Court's cases and from those
that the lower courts have heard, that several factors bear on the
252. Id
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING: LAW REVIEW ARTICLES,
STUDENT NOTES, SEMINAR PAPERS, AND GET7ING ON LAW REVIEW 21-31 (3d ed. 2007)
(describing test suites).
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ability of schools to regulate or punish the expressive activity of their
students. Courts have considered where the speech occurred, the
content of the speech, and the impact of the speech at the school. We
think that these factors will continue to be relevant as more courts
take up student cyberspeech cases. But while we too consider these
factors to be the most relevant ones to deciding cases like those
discussed above, we would assess the constitutionality of any
cyberspeech regulations in light of the following principles:
1. Minors Possess First Amendment Rights Outside School
We begin with the proposition that whatever the limits on their
expressive rights in school, public school students outside school have
First Amendment rights, or at least enjoy as much First Amendment
freedom as their parents will permit them. Limits on the school's
ability to regulate student speech must exist somewhere, lest students
be unable to escape the reach of school administrators while enrolled
at the school.
2. Technology Blurs On-Campus/Off-Campus Boundaries
Technology makes it more difficult than it used to be to separate
on-campus from off-campus speech; moreover, we think that any
resort to formalism to aid in that line-drawing is likely to be
unsatisfactory. Technology enables putatively off-campus speech to
come into the school with little effort on the student's part. If the
speech is of the sort that the Court has permitted the school to
exclude entirely, or if it is the source of "material and substantial
disruption," then it seems unduly formalistic to immunize a student
from punishment simply because she produced the speech off-
campus. At the same time, we emphasize that though technology
blurs these lines, it cannot eliminate them altogether-some
meaningful distinction between on- and off-campus speech must be
made by administrators and courts.
3. Begin With Assessment of Expressive Activity Itself
As many courts already do, we see value in courts asking in
student cyberspeech cases whether the speech is that which the school
is entitled to prohibit, either categorically or because of its impact in
the school. If the answer is "no"-that is, the speech is neither speech
that fits within one of the exceptions in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse,
nor is disruptive A la Tinker-then the inquiry ends. There is no need
to resolve the more difficult question about the school's jurisdiction
to regulate.
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4. Actions of the Student Are Important in Deciding Whether
Cyberspeech Is "On-Campus" Speech
The ability of the school to regulate student Internet speech
ought to turn in part on the degree to which the student-creator
sought to make others in the school aware of her off-campus speech
by publicizing it at school or encouraging others to access it at school.
While the correct answer will turn on the facts of particular cases, as a
general matter we think that a court should take into account the
extent and nature to which the expressive activity was done at school,
or using school materials; and, if done outside of the school, a court
should consider the nature and extent of the student-creator's efforts
to make those at school aware of the activity, any encouragement to
access the activity at school, etc.257
Thus, we think that the approach of courts in Mahaffey, Coy, and
Emmett to the question of whether student cyberspeech is on-campus
speech is preferable to that of J.S. and Layshock. In the former cases,
even if the student accessed the website at school once or twice, or
showed it to a fellow student at school, those actions did not
automatically make the student's speech on-campus speech. In close
cases, we think that courts would be entitled to consider the impact at
the school when trying to decide whether de minimis access at school
should render the expressive activity subject to administrators'
regulations. This was arguably the approach of the Layshock court,
257. One might frame this as, as at least one judge has, whether the impact of the on-
line expression at school was a reasonable foreseeable consequence of the student's
actions. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. For a very recent example of this
approach, see Wisniewski v. Bd. Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007). In Wisniewski, a
student was disciplined for creating an instant messaging icon that was "a small drawing of
a pistol firing at a person's head, above which were dots representing spattered blood."
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). Beneath the icon were the words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen,"
who was the student's English teacher. Id. In upholding the student's suspension, the
Court noted that "[t]he fact that [the student's] creation and transmission of the IM icon
occurred away from school property does not necessarily insulate him from school
discipline. We have recognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of
substantial disruption within a school .... ." Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). Another
possibility is to analogize to the standards employed by courts to assess whether
jurisdiction may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, be exercised over a particular
defendant. Cases involving websites created in one state or country, but accessible in
others, might be particularly helpful. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE §2.6, at 78 n.20 (5th ed. 2001)
(discussing "purposeful availment" and Internet websites).We thank Beth Burch for
suggesting this possibility. For a thorough elaboration of this point, see Kyle W. Brenton,
Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.com? Tracing the Boundaries of Public School Authority Over
Student Cyberspeech, 92 MINN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1085911 (last visited April 9, 2008).
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though we think the court erred on the issue of the impact
attributable to Layshock's website.
However, we think that students should not, without more, be
held responsible for speech or expressive activity engaged in off-
campus, but which made its way to school inadvertently or through
the actions of third persons. In Layshock, the court seemed to be
holding the student primarily responsible for the actions of other
students who, inspired by Layshock's parody site, created more
vulgar parody sites themselves, which were accessed by the students
and created disruption at the school.
Further, we reject the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision to
treat speech that is "aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel"
or is "brought onto the school campus or accessed at school" as on-
campus speech in all circumstances. 258 The Pennsylvania high court
even went further, warning students who "post[] school-targeted
material in a manner known to be freely accessible from school
grounds" may be subject to regulation even if they don't access it
themselves at school.5  Merely complaining about a school or about
school personnel on a personal website or blog should not ipso facto
mean that speech is no different from a speech made in a crowded
lunchroom or at a school assembly. Defining on-campus speech so
broadly, given the proliferation of means to access the Internet,
would tend to erase completely any boundary between on-campus
and off-campus speech. To make students liable for others accessing
their websites, even when students may have stumbled across it
accidentally might deter students from making any reference to
school, teachers, or classmates.
5. Morse Categorically Restricts School Officials' Ability to Punish
"Offensive" Speech
One of the bright spots in Morse for proponents of student
speech was the majority's rejection of both the school board's request
for a broad "educational mission" exception barring expression that
undermined the mission of the school (as declared by administrators)
and the rejection of a broad reading of Fraser to cover all speech or
expression deemed (again, by administrators) "offensive." While the
Court was not completely clear, rejecting those positions could also
signal an implicit rejection of a reading of Fraser that would provide
258. J.S. ex re. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002).
259. Id. at 865 n.12.
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schools more leeway to prohibit all manner of "low value" speech. If,
as the Court's opinion suggested, what was most objectionable about
Fraser's speech was its sexual nature,260 and the fact it was delivered to
a mixed-age group of students at a school assembly,26' that would
accord with the Court's other decisions approving of restrictions on
minors' access to sexually-explicit material on the grounds that
parents ought to decide whether, when, and to what extent to expose
their children to those materials. 262  However, while speech that is
merely offensive to administrators may not be categorically punished,
presumably Tinker's "widespread disruption" would provide an
independent reason for punishing the speech, if such disruption were
proven. There is nothing that would prevent a teacher from filing suit
against students (and their parents) if students create and distribute
online speech that is libelous.263 In most cases, the tort system-as
opposed to the school disciplinary system-is probably the more
260. Morse v. Fredrick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007). The majority specifically states
that Fraser "should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some
definition of 'offensive."' Id. at 2629. Instead, the majority focuses on the "elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" and "offensively lewd and indecent speech" that
gave rise to justified regulation by school officials. Id. at 2626.
261. See id. at 2626 (discussing the fact that school administrators can decide what
manner of speech is appropriate for a student assembly); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986) (stating that the school assembly consisted of 600 high
school students, some of whom were 14 years old).
262. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (restricting minors' access to
non-obscene pornography); see also John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment,
57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 334-37 (1979) (discussing Ginsberg).
263. In fact, such suits have already begun to be filed. In Texas, a high school assistant
principal filed a civil lawsuit against two students (and their parents) who created a fake
MySpace page featuring him. Chris Harris, High School Official Sues Students over Fake
MySpace Page, MTV, Sept. 25, 2006, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1541646/
20060925/id_0.jhtml; Ken Rodriguez, Lewd Web Posting About Principal Leads to
Lawsuit, School Options, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006, at A3, available
at http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/columnists/krodriguez/stories/MYSA092206.03A.
Rodriguez.2eb29de.html (citing the same lawsuit in Texas); accord Gil Kaufman, Cops
Investigating Fake MySpace Page That Defamed Minnesota Teacher, MTV, Apr. 13, 2006,
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/ 1528629/20060413/id_0.jhtml (discussing a similar
situation where students created a fake MySpace page for a teacher that included child
pornography and slurs about religion and sexual orientation); Kelli Kennedy, Not-So-
MySpace Any More, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 23, 2006, available at
http://www.theledger.com/apps/pbcs.diV/article?AID=/20060423/NEWS/604230392/l/NEW
S0101 (discussing a teacher's lawsuit against a student who posted "demeaning sexual
comments" and her picture on a website). For a brief overview of similar teacher suits, see
Libel Lessons: What do students learn about free speech from teachers who sue them for
defamation?, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER, Winter 2000-01, at 16, available at
http://splc.org/report-detail.asp?id=615&edition=17.
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appropriate forum for resolving severe cases of offensive student
speech directed at a teacher.
6. Do Not Dilute "Disruption"
Courts have (correctly in our view) been reluctant to find
"disruption" whenever students post or e-mail material school
administrators find vulgar, offensive, or insulting. 64 Most cases-
Beussink and Coy, for example-make clear that unless the
expressive activity had some fairly significant impact on the school as
a whole, or at least within a particular class, then it is protected.
We think that the Layshock court erred in allowing the student
Layshock to be punished not so much for the parody he posted, but
for the more vulgar parodies that he inspired. These parodies, not
Layshock's, were the ones that students accessed from school to such
an extent that the school's computer system was shut down while
officials blocked access to them. Layshock should be held responsible
for his activities alone, not for what he may have inspired others to
do. This principle, we think, has particular force when there is a close
question of whether the student did anything to make students at
school aware of what she created and how to access it from school.
The more a student attempts to keep the off-campus speech off-
campus, the less we think she should be punished if the actions of
others result in its being brought on campus, with accompanying
disruption.
Similarly, we think that courts should take care when considering
whether speech directed at a single student or teacher could be
"disruptive" enough to warrant discipline by the school. As the Ninth
Circuit was, we suspect, some courts will be tempted by the enigmatic
rights-of-other-students language from Tinker. Not only should the
Supreme Court's decision to vacate Harper give courts pause, there
are serious difficulties with using that test to regulate student speech.
Specifically, what are the "rights" of public school students vis-A-vis
the expressive activities of their classmates? A right not to be
gossiped about? Criticized? Ridiculed? Federal law does obligate
school to protect against certain types of harassment, but to convert
that ambiguous language from Tinker into an anti-bullying exception
stretches that language too far, and would offer administrators a
264. A case can be made that perceived threats of violence that perhaps fall short of
"true threats" merit a different standard. We discuss this scenario below.
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justification to punish student speech at least as broad as the
"educational mission" argument rejected in Morse.
Whatever the appropriate resolution for students, we think that
claims of widespread disruption occasioned by the effect of
cyberspeech on teachers ought to be greeted with skepticism. Mrs.
Fulmer, the teacher in J.S. was undoubtedly upset by the website.
But her reaction was, to us, wholly out of proportion to the nature of
the speech. To put it bluntly, adult teachers of adolescent or pre-teen
students ought to be expected to develop a thicker skin than had Mrs.
Fulmer. Unlike in the case of the "eggshell" victim in torts, a
student's discipline ought not turn on whether they happened to
ridicule the most sensitive member of the faculty. Further, it is worth
noting that Mrs. Fulmer became aware of the website only after the
assistant principal showed it to her. That the school was affected by
the absence of Mrs. Fulmer, moreover, says little about the extent to
which the website disrupted school operations as a whole.
7. A Different Standard for Possible Threats?
In light of the Columbine and the Virginia Tech shootings, as
well as a handful of other attacks planned but not carried out, school
administrators are especially vigilant about threats made by students
against the school, teachers, or other students. Further, there is
mounting concern among administrators and parents over
"cyberbullying," 265 which can involve threatening the sending or
posting of threatening messages. Outside the public school setting,
the Supreme Court has held that "true threats," defined as speech or
expressive activity directed at a person or group of persons that puts
the hearer in fear of being subjected to violence, do not receive First
Amendment protection.2" However, the Court has distinguished
"political hyperbole" from threats against the President,267 and has
held that the First Amendment presents formidable obstacles to those
prosecuted for inciting others to violence generally, even when
265. A recent survey concluded that "[nlearly a third of online teens say they have
been harassed on the Internet," including being sent "threatening or aggressive messages."
Associated Press, One-Third of Online Teens Bullied, Study Finds, CNN.cOM, June 28,
2007.
266. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) ("'True threats' encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.").
267. United States v. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
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violence eventually occurs.' May schools punish expressive activity
that falls short of a true threat, but which is perceived to advocate,
incite, or celebrate violence against the school or members of its
community, even if such activity does not meet the test set forth in
Brandenburg? Must schools exempt "hyperbolic" speech or
expressive activity urging violence from discipline? Given the Court's
justification of the drug-related speech exclusion on the "special
circumstances" extant in schools269 and Justice Alito's concurring
opinion justifying the exclusion by analogizing drug use to physical
harm,"° the answer to both questions appears to be "no." Since few
courts would, we wager, be willing to second-guess a school
administrator's taking action to address what she perceived as a
credible or possible threat to the school, room for considerable
overreaction exists. Still, given the gravity of the potential harm if
schools may take no action, and the virtual monopoly the state has on
education in most areas, we think that schools should not be bound
by the strict requirements of Claiborne Hardware or Brandenburg
when disciplining student speech that advocates-or reasonably
seems to advocate-violence directed against the school, its students,
or its employees. A different standard may be particularly
appropriate for cyberspeech cases. The absence of contextual clues
present in face-to-face speech and the anonymity of online speech can
make it difficult to discern the speaker's intent, and difficult to impute
irony, humor, or lack of seriousness to the speaker. At the same time,
we note that courts can, and have, served as a valuable check on
administrators' overreactions.
268. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 933-34 (1982) (requiring violence
allegedly incited to have occurred proximate in time to the alleged incitement);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (requiring proof of intent to produce
imminent lawless action, and likelihood that violence would, in fact, result). On the
tension between Black, Brandenburg, and Claiborne Hardware, see Steve G. Gey, A Few
Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1287 (2005).
269. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
270. Id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
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B. Harriet-the-spy.blogspot.com
Harriet Welsch271 is a junior at Ben Franklin High School-a
public high school-with a keen interest in using computers as a
means for self-expression. Consider the following scenarios:
(1) Harriet creates a blog in a computer class she is taking at
BFHS. Her blog consists mainly of her complaints about teachers
and students at the school. Her computer science teacher instructs
her to remove criticisms of teachers and students from the blog.
When Harriet refuses, she is removed from the class and suspended
from school.
(2) Using the school's e-mail system, Harriet sends the student
body a profanity-laced tirade against the school and its administrators
over her suspension. Specifically, her e-mail calls the computer
science teacher a "bitch" and the assistant principal in charge of
discipline "a stupid prick." While the e-mail produces little
discernable reaction at school, the parents of several students
complain about the language. Harriet is subjected to discipline for
the e-mail.
(3) Harriet creates a website at home that encourages the use of
illegal drugs. It contains testimonials from other students at BFHS
about their drug use and includes pictures showing BFHS students
using drugs. It mocks the school's anti-drug curriculum and ridicules
students who do not use drugs. Though she creates it at home, on her
computer, she e-mails the link using a school e-mail list and puts slips
of paper with the website's address in students' lockers at school.
When the principal uncovers the identity of the website's creator, he
suspends Harriet.
(4) While at school, Harriet posts, on her blog, doctored pictures
of the computer science teacher and the assistant principal making it
appear that they have goat heads. She e-mails the student body a
link. Students repeatedly access the pictures during the day, until the
information technology specialist at BFHS can block access to
Harriet's site. Teachers report to the assistant principal that their
271. Cf LOUISE FrrZHUGH, HARRIET THE SPY (Dell Yearling 2001) (1964) (detailing
the travails of a sixth-grade girl whose diary containing frank and unflattering portraits of
her friends falls into their hands).
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classes were in an uproar over the picture and that it took longer than
usual to settle their classes down.
(5) Upset by her suspension because of her refusal to take down
her blog in (1), Harriet sends a friend, from home and using her
Gmail account, a profanity-laced e-mail raging against the school and
its administrators over her suspension. Her e-mail describes the
computer science teacher as a "bitch" and the assistant principal in
charge of discipline as "a stupid prick." After Harriet and her friend
have a falling out, the recipient forwards the e-mail to the teacher and
assistant principal. Upset, the teacher complains to the assistant
principal; when Harriet refuses to apologize, he adds to her
suspension.
(6) At home, on her own computer, Harriet creates a blog whose
posts consist mainly of her making fun of teachers and students at the
school using vulgar and abusive language. She tells a few friends
about it while at school, and makes occasional updates to it during
study hall. Harriet's friends access it, and forward the link to other
students. A teacher becomes aware of the blog and reports it to the
assistant principal, who orders Harriet to take it down. When she
refuses, she is disciplined.
(7) At home, on her own computer, Harriet creates a blog
complaining about preferential treatment received by athletes and
cheerleaders by particular teachers at BFHS. She names names and
cites examples of bad behavior or substandard academic performance
that is given a pass by sympathetic teachers. She argues that the
school emphasizes athletics to an unhealthy degree and at the
expense of what she argues are other worthwhile extracurricular
activities, like drama or quiz bowl. After a story about the blog
appears in the school newspaper, it becomes a hit among many
students, but the teachers named, as well as some of the athletes (and
their parents), complain to the school about Harriet's blog. The
principal orders Harriet to remove her blog, because, he explains, the
blog's allegations have become a "distraction," "harm school
morale," and are disruptive. He suspends her when she refuses.
(8) Upset by her suspension because of her refusal to take down
her blog in (1), Harriet creates a new blog at home.
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(a) Amid the complaints about high school life, adolescence, and
her parents, she writes a post entitled: "PEOPLE WHO I HATE
AND WISH WOULD DIE." She includes a survey inviting visitors
to vote on how each person would die. Choices include "being eaten
by a giant Burmese python," "being struck by lightning," and
"mauled by a pack of starving dingos." Included on the list are the
computer science teacher and the assistant principal who punished
her, and a few classmates against whom Harriet harbors grudges.
Harriet shows the entry to her friend, who e-mails the link to another
student whose name is on Harriet's list. That student, in turn, e-mails
the link to the assistant principal. Both the computer science teacher,
to whom the principal shows the site, and the parents of several
students listed on the site demand that Harriet be expelled, citing
safety concerns. The computer science teacher is so fearful for her
safety that she is unable to come to work; a substitute has to be hired
for the last few weeks of the term. The school then initiates expulsion
proceedings against Harriet as a result of the website.
(b) Assume that instead of the message in (a), she posts a picture
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City after it
was destroyed by the truck bomb planted by Timothy McVeigh.
Using Photoshop, she writes "Ben Franklin High School" on the front
of the building; she titles her post, "BOOM." When another student
discovers the post and her parents notify the school authorities,
Harriet is immediately suspended and the school begins expulsion
proceedings against her. She maintains it was a joke.
(c) Upset that her ex-friend forwarded her e-mail in (5) to the
teacher who angered her by forcing her to take down her blog,
Harriet e-mails her friend using her home e-mail account saying,
among other things, that she "wouldn't be surprised if you have an
accident at school and no one helped you, because nobody likes
snitches." She adds, "I hope you die soon." Alarmed, the friend and
her parents contact the school, seeking to have Harriet removed from
school.
The school would encounter no difficulties disciplining Harriet
for (1) under Kuhimeier. The school may disassociate itself from
messages it thinks improper, especially in "non-public fora" like
classes. Similarly, following Fraser, (2) would probably present no
First Amendment problem. Sending a mass e-mail using the school's
e-mail addresses seems to us akin to addressing a school assembly.
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Moreover, Fraser seemed to condone the school's requirement of
civility and decency in communications to the student body. We
assume this means that the school can prohibit profanity, at least
when directed at the school population as a whole, though an
argument could be made that Morse focused on the sexual nature of
Fraser's speech. Further, Morse permits (3), especially, as we will
argue, when Harriet takes actions to bring her "off-campus" speech
on to campus. Finally, under Tinker, if sufficient evidence were
available that "widespread disruption" accompanied students'
viewing of the goat-headed teachers website in (4), she could be
disciplined for that, as well. The scenarios described in (5)-(8),
however, present more difficult questions, which we now consider in
some detail, using the principles articulated above.
C. Applying the Framework
1. Example (5): Harriet's Poison Pixel E-mail
However unwise it might be to describe her teachers in such
terms, we think that Harriet's speech is beyond the regulation of the
school. The facts indicate that the speech was clearly "off-campus"-
Harriet sent it from home on a private e-mail account to her friend's
e-mail account-and since it was sent to no one else, it could not
possibly be viewed as "disruptive." The only possible ground for
discipline would be under Fraser, but, given the off-campus nature of
the e-mail, the fact it was a private communication, the lack of
sexually explicit language, and the rejection by the Morse Court of
any reading of Fraser that permits discipline for "offensive" speech,
all sap Fraser of much value. 2
2. Example (6): Harriet Welsch and the Blog of Bile
Here the on-campus/off-campus question may be a bit closer,
since Harriet is updating the blog at school, and even showing it to
friends while at school. Again, however, the content of the blog does
not appear to fall within one of the exceptions, nor has it appeared to
272. Cf Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986) (refusing to permit
regulation of off-campus student expression). In Klein, a student was suspended for ten
days after he "flipped off" a teacher away from school grounds, in the parking lot of a
restaurant. Id. at 1441. The court highlighted the fact that the conduct was "far removed
from any school premises or facilities at a time when teacher Clark was not associated in
any way with his duties as a teacher." Id. Finding any possible connection between the
realm of the school and "giving the finger" to a teacher off-campus "far too attenuated,"
the court invalidated the school's attempt to discipline the student. Id. at 1441-42.
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cause a disruption. Even if one were to adopt the position that
Harriet's de minimis accessing and updating at school rendered it on-
campus speech, the cases furnish no authority for disciplining her.
That students to whom she showed the blog forwarded it to their
friends would not, under our analysis, automatically mean that it
became on-campus speech; but again, if a court took a different view,
the facts here would not support a finding of widespread disruption.
3. Example (7): Harriet the Muckraker
Harriet clearly intends her blog to be read and discussed at
school. She has not kept it private; indeed, she agreed to publicize it
via the school newspaper. Therefore, we think that her speech is
more clearly "on-campus" than in the other examples, even though
she created the blog at home and, presumably, used no school
resources. It is also clear that the subject matter of the blog does not
fall within one of the categorical exceptions that the school is
authorized to prohibit absolutely. The question, then, is whether the
discomfort it has produced is sufficiently disruptive to warrant
discipline.
While we suspect that some administrators may seek to prevent
"distractions" and other speech or expressive activity that "hurts
morale," we think that discipline of Harriet's speech here would be a
clear violation of her First Amendment rights, even under a narrow
conception of student rights that would protect only non-disruptive
"political" speech said to lie at the core of the Amendment.
If, as Tip O'Neil once quipped, "all politics is local," then the
speech here is closer to the "core" political speech of Tinker than to
the adolescent antics of Fraser or Morse. In Tinker, the children were
protesting what they saw to be an illegitimate and unwise military
action undertaken by the United States in Vietnam. In the example
above, Harriet is protesting what she sees as an unwise preference for
athletics over academics that results in unfair distinctions made
among students, with athletes receiving preferential treatment. She is
protesting school politics, in other words. Moreover, if the principal
in Tinker was unable to discipline the children for their armbands
absent some distruption, and if nondisruptive speech thought
"offensive" by teachers is not susceptible to regulation (as Morse
holds), then censoring speech that is "distracting" or that harms
morale is even less of a legitimate ground for discipline. If particular
students or teachers feel as if Harriet's allegations are actionable, it is,
in our opinion, better to use private law mechanisms (like libel) than
resorting to state-sponsored censorship.
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4. Example (8): "[Harriet] Spoke in Class Today ,
273
Our final example presents the most difficult issue of all: Dealing
with student speech that may be a threat. True threats receive no
First Amendment protection, wherever uttered. Before Virginia v.
Black, commentators and judges debated whether the focus should be
on the speaker or the listener.274 The Court in Black settled on the
former, asking whether the speaker intended to put another in fear of
physical violence? 275 Under that definition, only our example in 8(c)
would likely qualify.
Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Morse, with its focus on the
physical safety of students while at school, seems to invite a different
analysis: If a recipient of a student's message could reasonably
understand the language to be threatening to another student, to
school employees, or the school itself, then the school should be able
to take action.276  Even ambiguous "threats"-call them "quasi-
threats"-should be able to be disciplined by schools either on the
theory that they possess de minimis value as speech, or in order to
deter students making threats or quasi-threats against the school, its
273. Cf PEARL JAM, Jeremy, on TEN (Epic Records 1991).
274. See Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36
CONN. L. REV. 541, 558-59 (2004) (discussing the history of First Amendment case law
and recognizing that the Supreme Court does not consider "political hyperbole" or
statements made in jest "true threats"); Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and
the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 197, 216-17
(questioning the role of intent in First Amendment "true threat" cases); see also Nina
Petraro, Harmful Speech and True Threats: Virginia v. Black and the First Amendment in
an Age of Terrorism, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 531, 548 (2006) (discussing the
rationale of judges and scholars in the history of the true threats doctrine).
275. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003).
276. For an case illustrative of the approach described above, see Boim v. Fulton Co.
School Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2007). In Boim the court upheld suspension of a
student for a story she wrote describing a fictional dream in which she shot a teacher. The
court reasoned that if Morse supported a categorical exclusion for speech advocating
illegal drug use because of the physical danger drug use posed to students, "[t]hat same
rationale applies equally, if not more strongly, to speech reasonably construed as a threat
of school violence." Id. at 984. See also Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765,
771-72 (5th Cir. 2007) ("If school administrators are permitted to prohibit student speech
that advocates illegal drug use because 'illegal drug use presents a grave and in many ways
unique threat to the physical safety of students,' . . . then it defies logical extrapolation to
hold school administrators to a stricter standard with respect to speech that gravely and
uniquely threatens violence ... to the school population as a whole." (footnote omitted)).
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students and employees, or both.2" (An analogy here might be to the
punishment of jokes about hijacking or the carrying of weapons
enforced in airports and on airplanes. 78 )
Each of the examples in (8), however, offers a further
complication: none are clearly "on-campus" speech. Thus, we begin
by asking which, if any, the school would be able to reach assuming
all are examples of on-campus speech. We think that strongest case
would be 8(c), while the weakest case would be 8(a). Example 8(b) is
the least clear of the three. We regard 8(a) as the weakest case for
discipline under our framework because while the comments might
be insensitive, even offensive, no reasonable person should regard
their presence on such a list as akin to a real promise by Harriet to do
violence to their person (mauled by dingos?). 279 By contrast, it would
not be unreasonable for the recipient of the e-mail in 8(c) to interpret
277. Another reason for permitting administrators to punish this type of speech
include the inherent disruptiveness that would accompany suspected threats, since
administrators would likely take them seriously, investigate them, perhaps involve the
police, etc. See, e.g., In Re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 762 (Wis. 2001) (Prosser, J.,
dissenting) (offering reasons for punishing even "joking" threats made by public school
students against other students or school employees, including the need to take threats
seriously, impairment of the learning atmosphere, tendency to produce panic among
students and employees, and the lack of contribution to the exposition of ideas protected
by the First Amendment).
278. United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325, 1329, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting
constitutional attack on statute prohibiting the making of false statements concerning an
attempt to commit air piracy as applied to passenger who joked about hijacking a plane
prior to takeoff; "[t]he legislative history makes clear that Congress was concerned with
the prankster as well as with the individual acting out of malice, and has decreed that the
conveyance of such false information is no joking matter.") The Court found that the
conviction did not violate the First Amendment because it closely approximated the false
cry of "fire" in a crowded theater. Id. at 1330-31. See also Boim, 494 F.3d at 984 ("Just as
there is no First Amendment right to falsely yell 'fire' in a crowded theater ... or to
knowingly make false comments regarding the possession of an explosive degvice while on
board an aircraft . . . there is also no First Amenndment right allowing a student to
knowingly make comments, whether oral or written, that reasonably could be perceived as
a threat of school violence ...... ); Leigh Noffsinger, Comment, Wanted Posters,
Bulletproof Vests, and the First Amendment: Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive
Advocacy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1209, 1233 (1999) ("Certain speech, because of its context,
should be subject to a strict liability standard regardless of the speaker's intent. For
instance, making a joke about semiautomatic weapons would not be protected speech at
an airport security checkpoint; even if intended as a political statement about international
terrorism, security guards would understand the speech in context as a serious threat,
which exempts the speech from First Amendment protection.").
279. Winne Hu, L.I. Teenagers Are Accused In Attack Plot On a School, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2007, at B02. Long Island teenagers were arrested for plotting a terrorist attack
on their school which included creating a "hit list" of students; however, other students
merely took this as a way to blow off steam, rather than a serious threat. Id.
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it as threatening given the e-mail's emphasis on the hope that harm
soon come to the reader in an apparent attempt to arose fear or dread
in the reader.
Should the fact that it was almost certainly not on-campus speech
affect the analysis? Here we are tempted to relax our on-campus/off-
campus line. Where quasi-threats are involved, directing the speech
or expressive activity at the school community or its members ought
to render it on-campus speech and subject to discipline, given the fact
that those issued outside school, the recipient might be reluctant to
continue to attend school knowing that he or she would see Harriet
every day. ° Since even ambiguous or "joking" threats take place
against the contemporary reality of school violence, school personnel
have to take such threats seriously, which entails disruption of the
learning environment, in addition to the fear that such quasi-threats
might engender among the students and employees. Balanced against
such costs, the value of such expression is, for us, de minimis at best.
This leaves 8(b), which is difficult because we think that, in
addition to the difficulty of the on-campus/off-campus issue, the
message itself could be considered ambiguous. There is, after all, no
overt threat. On the other hand, we do not think that it would be
unreasonable to interpret it as some kind of threat that warrants
investigation by administrators. One could easily interpret the
picture of the ruined Murrah building with the name of the high
school as some sort of threat to do the same to the school. Whether
the expression warrants discipline is a tough question, but, again,
there might be an argument for discipline based on the need to deter
jokes about committing violence at school or against the school. The
ready analogy might be to punishing students for calling in false bomb
threats against the school, even as a joke. 1
Obviously, we can only scratch the surface here. The facts and
circumstances of student speech cases will be limited only by the
imagination of the students themselves. But these hypotheticals seem
280. Perhaps this is where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was headed in J.S. The
Court spent considerable time discussing whether the items posted about Mrs. Fulmer
constituted a "true threat" before concluding that it was not, but that since it was directed
against the school and its teachers, the speech was on-campus speech. J.S., 807 A.2d at
856-60; see also id. at 870 (Zappala, C.J., concurring) (concluding that the "true threat"
test was met).
281. See, e.g., State ex reL RT, 781 So. 2d 1239, 1246 (La. 2001) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to conviction of juvenile for making a false bomb threat against
school).
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to us to encompass a spectrum of likely scenarios. As we hope to
have demonstrated, the correct answer is not always readily apparent.
We have, however, attempted to construct, within the confines of the
case law, principles that can guide judges and administrators, which
balance students' First Amendment rights with administrators' need
to maintain order and safety for students in their charge.
One final point ought to be made. The principles outlined here
are not self-executing. We are confident that most school
administrators faced with the forms of student expression discussed
here would act reasonably most of the time. As the cases
demonstrate, however, school administrators are as vulnerable to
anger, irritation, fear, and overreaction as the rest of us. Courts
should continue to serve as a forum for the sober second thought.
While this function is not always an easy role to fulfill without
seeming to second-guess those "on the ground," it is, we submit, a
vital role. Deference should not slide into pusillanimity, particularly
where the effects on students subject to suspension or to discipline
can be dire.
VI. Conclusion
Whatever else Morse means for students' First Amendment
rights in general, the Court's decision provided little guidance to
teachers and administrators struggling with online student speech. By
accepting uncritically the school's claim that the Olympic Relay was a
school-related event, the Court was able to sidestep the difficult
question of how far off-campus the school's jurisdiction reached-the
issue on which school administrators are most in need of direction.
On the other hand, Morse made clear that mere offensiveness,
without more, is an insufficient reason to discipline student
expression. This fact alone might help courts dispose of a number of
cyberspeech cases, given that many such cases arise as a result of
crude or vulgar comments directed at teachers and administrators by
students.
In his efforts to narrow the scope of the Morse opinion, Justice
Alito might have inadvertently encouraged administrators to make
further analogies to activities akin to "physical harm" that would
justify regulation. The majority's endorsement of the categorization
of student speech will likely further encourage schools to argue for
other content-based exceptions to Tinker's requirement of disruption.
Until the Court decides to speak again, however, school
administrators will still be required to make decisions regarding
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online student speech. We have offered a framework that respects
students' First Amendment rights and places real-but not unduly
formalistic-limits on the reach of school authority, while also
accommodating the legitimate need to provide a safe and orderly
learning environment for students and teachers alike.
